After SUNY Albany cut its women's tennis team in 2016, several former players, along with the team's coach, Gordon Graham, sued the university alleging discrimination in violation of Title IX. Last week, a federal court in New York denied the university's motion to dismiss Graham's claims that the decision amounted to sex discrimination against him, while also denying the former players' motion for summary judgment in their favor.
In its motion to dismiss Graham's claim, the university argued that terminating the women's tennis team could not in any way be considered sex discrimination against Graham, a male coach.
But the court disagreed. While it's true that the university's decision to cut the women's tennis team was not motivated by Graham's sex, it may have been motivated by the sex of the athletes on the team. This act of alleged sex discrimination injured Graham as well, by costing him his job, making it actionable injury under Title IX, the court reasoned. Graham adequately alleged an act of sex discrimination, and he alleged that the act in question caused him harm.
As for the players' motion, they argued that because in 2017 OCR found SUNY Albany's decision to eliminate women's tennis violated Title IX, there was no issue of fact requiring litigation, permitting the court to rule in their favor early in the litigation process prior to trial or even the taking of discovery. The court disagreed with this argument as well, concluding that the agency's findings could not make the university automatically liable as a matter of law. The university did not challenge the agency's findings, but instead, agreed to resolve in them without the benefit of adjudication, and in an agreement that specifically disclaimed any admission of liability. Thus, the court ruled, the university should at least have the chance to enter evidence that could potentially demonstrate that a disproportionate balance of athletic opportunities nevertheless complies with Title IX. I believe that the former players still have a very strong case, since cutting a viable team is usually strong evidence of unmet interest of the underrepresented sex. But also, it made sense for the court to insist that they make their case based on a record produced during litigation, rather than automatically import the findings of OCR.
Pejovic, v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 2018 WL 3614169 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018).
Tuesday, July 31, 2018
Saturday, July 28, 2018
Another Court Upholds Transgender Students' Bathroom Rights
Another federal court has ruled that transgender students have a right to use the bathrooms and locker rooms that match their gender identity (for others, see here). The case involved Dallas High School, in Dallas, Oregon, which created an inclusive bathroom policy after one of its transgender students request permission to use the boys' facilities, consistent with his gender identity. But parents of other male students at the school sued, alleging their boys suffered "embarrassment, humiliation, anxiety, intimidation, fear, apprehension
and stress produced by using the restroom with students of the opposite
sex."
The court rejected the parents' claim that permitting transgender students in the locker room compromised their children's privacy. In addition to lack of precedent to support the idea that the constitution protects a fundamental right not to share restrooms or locker rooms with transgender students, the court noted that such a right, if it existed, is not infringed. Students are not compelled to use multi-user facilities; anyone with a privacy concern is permitted to a private single-user facility. The court also rejected the parent's claim that the school's inclusive policy violated Title IX by creating a hostile environment for their children. Finally, it concluded that the parent's requested relief -- revoking the policy and excluding the transgender boy from the boys' restrooms and locker rooms -- would itself violate Title IX, since this would "punish transgender students for their gender nonconformity and constitute a form of sex stereotyping."
The parents also included the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Justice Department as defendants in the case. They alleged that the agencies' joint 2016 guidance document, that interpreted Title IX to require trans-inclusive bathrooms, was improperly promulgated. That guidance has been subsequently revoked, however, so it was easy for the court to dismiss this claim for lack of standing: there is no apparent connection between the procedural violation they allege and the school's decision to implement an inclusive policy.
Decision: Parents for Privacy v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2., 2018 WL 3550267 (D. Or. July 24, 2018). News of the decision was also reported here.
And in related news, the Third Circuit released its decision affirming a lower court's decision in a similar case in Pennsylvania. The lower court had refused to grant a preliminary injunction that would have prevented the school from accommodating transgender students' use of facilities that match their gender identities, and the appellate court agreed with the court's "well-reasoned" opinion. That decision is: Doe v Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 3581456 (3d Cir. July 26, 2018),
The court rejected the parents' claim that permitting transgender students in the locker room compromised their children's privacy. In addition to lack of precedent to support the idea that the constitution protects a fundamental right not to share restrooms or locker rooms with transgender students, the court noted that such a right, if it existed, is not infringed. Students are not compelled to use multi-user facilities; anyone with a privacy concern is permitted to a private single-user facility. The court also rejected the parent's claim that the school's inclusive policy violated Title IX by creating a hostile environment for their children. Finally, it concluded that the parent's requested relief -- revoking the policy and excluding the transgender boy from the boys' restrooms and locker rooms -- would itself violate Title IX, since this would "punish transgender students for their gender nonconformity and constitute a form of sex stereotyping."
The parents also included the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Justice Department as defendants in the case. They alleged that the agencies' joint 2016 guidance document, that interpreted Title IX to require trans-inclusive bathrooms, was improperly promulgated. That guidance has been subsequently revoked, however, so it was easy for the court to dismiss this claim for lack of standing: there is no apparent connection between the procedural violation they allege and the school's decision to implement an inclusive policy.
Decision: Parents for Privacy v. Dallas Sch. Dist. No. 2., 2018 WL 3550267 (D. Or. July 24, 2018). News of the decision was also reported here.
And in related news, the Third Circuit released its decision affirming a lower court's decision in a similar case in Pennsylvania. The lower court had refused to grant a preliminary injunction that would have prevented the school from accommodating transgender students' use of facilities that match their gender identities, and the appellate court agreed with the court's "well-reasoned" opinion. That decision is: Doe v Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 2018 WL 3581456 (3d Cir. July 26, 2018),
Friday, July 27, 2018
OCR Investigation Reveals "Concerns and Violations" At Washington State University
This month the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights entered into a compliance agreement with Washington State University to resolve "concerns and violations" that were revealed by the agency's investigation into the university's handling of sexual harassment complaints.
One of the allegations against the university was its systematic failure to promptly respond to complaints as Title IX requires. So the agency reviewed over 900 files of sexual harassment cases the university responded to between 2010 and 2016. 72 of them were sexual assault matters. The average pendency of these matters from the time the complaint was was received by the university to the time of its final decision was 159 days. More than three-quarters of time, it took more than 100 days, and nearly a third were open for 200 days. While expressing concern about the university's systemic pattern of lethargic resolution, it singled out four instances where it was comfortable concluding that the delay (of 125, 139, 177, and 218 days respectively) constituted a violation of Title IX's prompt resolution requirement, owing to the university's insufficient explanation for the delays and the probability that delay contributed to hostile environment for the complainant. This aspect of OCR's findings indicate that while the agency has revoked the prior administration's interpretation of prompt resolution of sexual harassment complaints as 60 day time frame under usual circumstances, the requirement for "promptness" -- albeit more vague now -- is still good law about which OCR remains concerned.
The agency also expressed "concerns" that the university's policies that govern the disciplinary process for sexual misconduct provide equal rights to the respondent to present evidence and receive information about the proceeding. Specifically, the agency was concerned about procedural requirements under which:
The university has agreed to address the violations and concerns by amending its policies and improving training. It will also address the resource deficiency that caused or contributed to the promptness violations. It also agreed to send an apology letter to two of the complainants affected by delay. (I've ever noticed apology requirements in resolution agreements before, so that struck me as interesting.!)
One of the allegations against the university was its systematic failure to promptly respond to complaints as Title IX requires. So the agency reviewed over 900 files of sexual harassment cases the university responded to between 2010 and 2016. 72 of them were sexual assault matters. The average pendency of these matters from the time the complaint was was received by the university to the time of its final decision was 159 days. More than three-quarters of time, it took more than 100 days, and nearly a third were open for 200 days. While expressing concern about the university's systemic pattern of lethargic resolution, it singled out four instances where it was comfortable concluding that the delay (of 125, 139, 177, and 218 days respectively) constituted a violation of Title IX's prompt resolution requirement, owing to the university's insufficient explanation for the delays and the probability that delay contributed to hostile environment for the complainant. This aspect of OCR's findings indicate that while the agency has revoked the prior administration's interpretation of prompt resolution of sexual harassment complaints as 60 day time frame under usual circumstances, the requirement for "promptness" -- albeit more vague now -- is still good law about which OCR remains concerned.
The agency also expressed "concerns" that the university's policies that govern the disciplinary process for sexual misconduct provide equal rights to the respondent to present evidence and receive information about the proceeding. Specifically, the agency was concerned about procedural requirements under which:
- complainant is solicited for names of potential witnesses, though the policy does not say to do the same for respondent
- complainant is given information that retaliation is prohibited under its policy, but the policy does not say to also give respondent this information
- complainant is given the opportunity to provide input about the appropriate resolution path --i.e., whether the university uses an informal method of resolution instead of the formal process -- but the policy does not say to get input from the respondent.
The university has agreed to address the violations and concerns by amending its policies and improving training. It will also address the resource deficiency that caused or contributed to the promptness violations. It also agreed to send an apology letter to two of the complainants affected by delay. (I've ever noticed apology requirements in resolution agreements before, so that struck me as interesting.!)
Saturday, July 21, 2018
Cuts at UNM Still Fall Short of Title IX Compliance
Earlier this year I posted about the University of New Mexico's decision to publish its consultant's report that, I thought, bent over backwards to reach the conclusion that cutting sports is necessary for Title IX compliance. Interestingly, however, the university's announcement today that it will cut two men's and two women's teams does not put the university into compliance.
The university will eliminate men's soccer and skiing, a total of 38 opportunities. This will bring the total number of men's opportunities from 319 to 280. On the women's side, the university will eliminate beach volleyball and skiing, a total of 25 opportunities. This will leave women with 218 opportunities, compared to the 243 they have now. Women will therefore receive 43.8% of the athletic opportunities, but because women make up 54.9% of the undergraduate student body, the university is still a long ways off from proportionality. In addition, by cutting two existing women's teams, the university has likely disqualified itself from compliance under either of the alternative tests. Cutting women's teams is the opposite of expanding opportunities for the underrepresented sex, the second compliance test. And it creates unmet interest and ability among the underrepresented sex, which demonstrates lack of compliance with the third test.
The university's plan also calls for phasing out diving from the women’s swimming and diving program, significantly reducing men’s track and field participation slots, and increasing participation opportunities in some women’s programs. However, there is no way that these modest changes will close the proportionality gap. There are 5 divers on the swimming and diving team. And most of UNM's other female sport rosters already exceed the NCAA Division I average squad size. (One sport, women's soccer, has 40 players despite an NCAA average of 28!) The only two teams that don't exceed the average would reach the average by adding only 1 player to the roster. Thus, the university's roster management plan --- unless it plans to inflate rosters with opportunities that it won't legally be able to count under Title IX --- will probably involve a net loss of female athlete opportunities, rather than a gain. That means, the university would have to make up the proportionality gap by cutting over 100 men's opportunities, according to my math. Yet, the men's track team doesn't even have that many on the roster.
By cutting women's teams, UNM is making its compliance challenges worse, not better. This result is not consistent with its pointing at Title IX as a key factor in the decision to downsize its athletic programs in the first place.
The university will eliminate men's soccer and skiing, a total of 38 opportunities. This will bring the total number of men's opportunities from 319 to 280. On the women's side, the university will eliminate beach volleyball and skiing, a total of 25 opportunities. This will leave women with 218 opportunities, compared to the 243 they have now. Women will therefore receive 43.8% of the athletic opportunities, but because women make up 54.9% of the undergraduate student body, the university is still a long ways off from proportionality. In addition, by cutting two existing women's teams, the university has likely disqualified itself from compliance under either of the alternative tests. Cutting women's teams is the opposite of expanding opportunities for the underrepresented sex, the second compliance test. And it creates unmet interest and ability among the underrepresented sex, which demonstrates lack of compliance with the third test.
The university's plan also calls for phasing out diving from the women’s swimming and diving program, significantly reducing men’s track and field participation slots, and increasing participation opportunities in some women’s programs. However, there is no way that these modest changes will close the proportionality gap. There are 5 divers on the swimming and diving team. And most of UNM's other female sport rosters already exceed the NCAA Division I average squad size. (One sport, women's soccer, has 40 players despite an NCAA average of 28!) The only two teams that don't exceed the average would reach the average by adding only 1 player to the roster. Thus, the university's roster management plan --- unless it plans to inflate rosters with opportunities that it won't legally be able to count under Title IX --- will probably involve a net loss of female athlete opportunities, rather than a gain. That means, the university would have to make up the proportionality gap by cutting over 100 men's opportunities, according to my math. Yet, the men's track team doesn't even have that many on the roster.
By cutting women's teams, UNM is making its compliance challenges worse, not better. This result is not consistent with its pointing at Title IX as a key factor in the decision to downsize its athletic programs in the first place.
Friday, July 20, 2018
What Is an Institution's Title IX Responsibility When Assailant's Victim Attends Another School?
Two items on my radar this week both address the question of an institution's legal obligations under Title IX to discipline one of its own students for sexual misconduct directed at a student of another university.
First, a recent decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a former Providence College student's case against Brown University, in which she challenged the sufficiency of Brown's response to her report of having been sexually assaulted by three Brown football players. Title IX requires plaintiffs who assert a claim for money damages on the deliberate indifference theory to prove “substantial interference with her access to educational opportunities or benefits.” The plaintiff argued that she satisfied this requirement because she withdrew from Providence College as a result of the sexual assault and Brown's allegedly insufficient response. But, the appellate court concluded that the fact she was not a student at Brown disqualified her from satisfying this requirement. The court read the Supreme Court's prior Title IX caselaw to require that the plaintiff must suffer sex discrimination "while participating, or at least attempting to participate, in the funding recipient's education program or activity." This nexus is "logical" according to the court because the "'discrimination' that Title IX prohibits is not the acts of sexual assault or sexual harassment in and of themselves, but rather the differential treatment by a funding recipient of persons of a particular sex who are taking part or trying to take part in its educational program or activity but are suffering acts of sexual harassment or assault that undermine their educational experience." Doe v. Brown Univ., 2018 WL 3454469 (1st Cir. July 18, 2018)
It is not surprising that a court would limit a university's liability to a student seeking to impose liability for money damages. Title IX's status as a Spending Clause statute means that a university's primary compliance obligation is owed to the government, in exchange for federal funding. Students who are harmed as a result of an institution's Title IX violations are considered third-party beneficiaries of this arrangement. According to the Supreme Court, universities aren't necessarily on notice of the fact that taking government money makes them liable for damages to third parties, so it has limited such liability to situations in which the university intended the harm (or its deemed equivalent, deliberate indifference). For this reason, there are tougher liability standards in court cases than in situations where the government is enforcing Title IX. In this spirit, I can understand why a court would not want to make a university financially liable for any sexual misconduct committed by its student anywhere in the world that happens to affect the victim's education. But, just because a university isn't liable financially to another university's student, doesn't mean that the government can't impose that requirement as part of its enforcement authority.
And maybe, the government is considering doing just that? According to this story in Inside Higher Education, OCR is investigating a case about a student from University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, who was sexually assaulted, off campus, by a student from University of Alabama-Birmingham. The victim filed a complaint with the assailant's institution, which found that the assailant had twice had nonconsensual sex with the victim. But when the assailant appealed, his two-year suspension was reduced to one year. When the victim appealed that decision, UAB reversed the original decision in its entirety, on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to punish a student for off-campus misconduct that did not create adverse affects or a hostile environment for someone on campus.The fact that OCR is investigating this matter suggests that it thinks its at least plausible that the victim's complaint adequately alleges a Title IX violation by UAB. If that is indeed how OCR resolves the matter, universities might have a Title IX responsibility to adequately discipline their own students for sexual harassment and sexual misconduct against other students -- though its failure to do so could only be addressed by government enforcement rather than in the courts (at least in jurisdictions that follow the First Circuit's approach).
Two other points that are worth mentioning about these kinds of cases: there is little doubt that a university *could,* if it wanted to, have a code of conduct that prohibits its students from engaging in misconduct off campus that results in harm to other people who are not students of the university. The cases in this post are addressing whether a university *must* take jurisdiction over the subset of misconduct that falls under Title IX, sexual harassment and sexual assault. The second point that's clear is that the victim's student's university has a Title IX obligation to respond to the threat of sexual misconduct that is posed to its own student, even if the source of that threat is another university's student. However, a university does not have power to discipline another university's student, so often the best it can do is bar the offending student from campus (which is apparently what UTC did).
First, a recent decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a former Providence College student's case against Brown University, in which she challenged the sufficiency of Brown's response to her report of having been sexually assaulted by three Brown football players. Title IX requires plaintiffs who assert a claim for money damages on the deliberate indifference theory to prove “substantial interference with her access to educational opportunities or benefits.” The plaintiff argued that she satisfied this requirement because she withdrew from Providence College as a result of the sexual assault and Brown's allegedly insufficient response. But, the appellate court concluded that the fact she was not a student at Brown disqualified her from satisfying this requirement. The court read the Supreme Court's prior Title IX caselaw to require that the plaintiff must suffer sex discrimination "while participating, or at least attempting to participate, in the funding recipient's education program or activity." This nexus is "logical" according to the court because the "'discrimination' that Title IX prohibits is not the acts of sexual assault or sexual harassment in and of themselves, but rather the differential treatment by a funding recipient of persons of a particular sex who are taking part or trying to take part in its educational program or activity but are suffering acts of sexual harassment or assault that undermine their educational experience." Doe v. Brown Univ., 2018 WL 3454469 (1st Cir. July 18, 2018)
It is not surprising that a court would limit a university's liability to a student seeking to impose liability for money damages. Title IX's status as a Spending Clause statute means that a university's primary compliance obligation is owed to the government, in exchange for federal funding. Students who are harmed as a result of an institution's Title IX violations are considered third-party beneficiaries of this arrangement. According to the Supreme Court, universities aren't necessarily on notice of the fact that taking government money makes them liable for damages to third parties, so it has limited such liability to situations in which the university intended the harm (or its deemed equivalent, deliberate indifference). For this reason, there are tougher liability standards in court cases than in situations where the government is enforcing Title IX. In this spirit, I can understand why a court would not want to make a university financially liable for any sexual misconduct committed by its student anywhere in the world that happens to affect the victim's education. But, just because a university isn't liable financially to another university's student, doesn't mean that the government can't impose that requirement as part of its enforcement authority.
And maybe, the government is considering doing just that? According to this story in Inside Higher Education, OCR is investigating a case about a student from University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, who was sexually assaulted, off campus, by a student from University of Alabama-Birmingham. The victim filed a complaint with the assailant's institution, which found that the assailant had twice had nonconsensual sex with the victim. But when the assailant appealed, his two-year suspension was reduced to one year. When the victim appealed that decision, UAB reversed the original decision in its entirety, on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to punish a student for off-campus misconduct that did not create adverse affects or a hostile environment for someone on campus.The fact that OCR is investigating this matter suggests that it thinks its at least plausible that the victim's complaint adequately alleges a Title IX violation by UAB. If that is indeed how OCR resolves the matter, universities might have a Title IX responsibility to adequately discipline their own students for sexual harassment and sexual misconduct against other students -- though its failure to do so could only be addressed by government enforcement rather than in the courts (at least in jurisdictions that follow the First Circuit's approach).
Two other points that are worth mentioning about these kinds of cases: there is little doubt that a university *could,* if it wanted to, have a code of conduct that prohibits its students from engaging in misconduct off campus that results in harm to other people who are not students of the university. The cases in this post are addressing whether a university *must* take jurisdiction over the subset of misconduct that falls under Title IX, sexual harassment and sexual assault. The second point that's clear is that the victim's student's university has a Title IX obligation to respond to the threat of sexual misconduct that is posed to its own student, even if the source of that threat is another university's student. However, a university does not have power to discipline another university's student, so often the best it can do is bar the offending student from campus (which is apparently what UTC did).
Tuesday, July 17, 2018
Baylor settles another case (and more)
One by one, Baylor is settling its Title IX lawsuits. Last week, the lawsuit brought by a former student (she withdrew after the college failed to respond properly to her report of gang rape) was settled with the terms remaining confidential.
[There is also news, quiet news, that the school has made agreements with three other students who did not filed lawsuits.]
This case, as I noted above, involved up to 8 football players who are alleged to have drugged and raped the victim, a female volleyball player. The victim's mother reported the rape to an assistant football coach and gave him names. After conducting his own investigation--and not reporting it to the proper people on campus (though as we know from previous lawsuits those people did not do anything anyway even when they received reports), the coach concluded that the sex acts, which the players reported as "fooling around," fell into a sexual gray area and did not pursue further action; and did not follow through with the victim.
This was a pretty clear cut case in terms of Baylor's failure to follow proper procedures. And yet...
Still it adds to the evidence about the culture of sexual violence on campus; one that, I argue, has not been sufficiently addressed even with the firing of head coach Art Briles, resignation of athletic director Ian McCaw* (who is now the AD at Liberty University), and demotion of president Kenneth Starr.
The school continues to have a revolving door of Title IX administrators. It refuses to admit it has a problem with sexual violence. It refuses to address the issue of athlete sexual violence, which is the result of lack of oversight of athletes and the athletics program. It has demonstrated that is values its male athletes over its female athletes. It has its most notable female, basketball coach Kim Mulkey, defending the school and disparaging those who spoke out against the sexual violence. But in its statement about the settlement, the university contends that the new leadership is committed to change.
And now we have the commissioner of the Big 12 contributing to the culture of denial by dancing around the issue at media days this week.
Still awaiting Baylor: two more lawsuits against the Baptist university which involved a total of 15 plaintiffs; the results of the NCAA's (very late to the game) investigation; and the conference's "verification"--not an investigation--that BU is implementing the 100+ recommendations from the Pepper Hamilton report. (The university is being denied 25% of the revenues it would earn from being in the Big 12 until the verification process is complete.)
* The more: McCaw has been in the headlines because he was recently subpoenaed in one of the remaining lawsuits. The high and mighty tone is off-putting. He said he resigned--after he was placed on probation in 2016--because he did not want to be part of a cover-up. Except he was already part of a cover-up--because there is no way he did not know what was going on in his football program.
He said the report of findings (2016) in which the football program was deemed responsible for many of the problems of sexual violence was steeped in racism and that the regents were looking for scapegoats.
I do not doubt that there is rampant racism at Baylor, including in its athletics department; because there is rampant racism in intercollegiate sports. I do not doubt--in fact I have written about this already--that the regents are part of the problem. And it is a problem that their role has not been investigated and interrogated.
And though McCaw took some responsibility for his role, this testimony read like a shunned person seeking retribution. If there was such a problem with racism in athletics and the school in general, why wasn't McCaw working to address it? He was not the most powerful person (as he came to realize), but he could taken steps. And if he felt the whole system was so corrupt, why didn't he resign earlier? I am not sure what effect his testimony will have on the lawsuits, but it has invigorated others looking to pass the buck.
Briles's attorneys have jumped on this testimony saying that the school threw the former coach under the proverbial bus. First, he deserved to be fired for reasons too great to even list. Second, if he was surprised that he--a successful white, male DI football coach was expendable, that he could be used as a pawn to mitigate the effects of a huge scandal, then he really is not knowledgeable about the system which created and then ultimately tossed him aside. Because once in a great while even powerful white men in intercollegiate athletics are sacrificed to keep the system going. Neither Briles nor McCraw should be shocked by this; they helped perpetuate it.
[There is also news, quiet news, that the school has made agreements with three other students who did not filed lawsuits.]
This case, as I noted above, involved up to 8 football players who are alleged to have drugged and raped the victim, a female volleyball player. The victim's mother reported the rape to an assistant football coach and gave him names. After conducting his own investigation--and not reporting it to the proper people on campus (though as we know from previous lawsuits those people did not do anything anyway even when they received reports), the coach concluded that the sex acts, which the players reported as "fooling around," fell into a sexual gray area and did not pursue further action; and did not follow through with the victim.
This was a pretty clear cut case in terms of Baylor's failure to follow proper procedures. And yet...
Still it adds to the evidence about the culture of sexual violence on campus; one that, I argue, has not been sufficiently addressed even with the firing of head coach Art Briles, resignation of athletic director Ian McCaw* (who is now the AD at Liberty University), and demotion of president Kenneth Starr.
The school continues to have a revolving door of Title IX administrators. It refuses to admit it has a problem with sexual violence. It refuses to address the issue of athlete sexual violence, which is the result of lack of oversight of athletes and the athletics program. It has demonstrated that is values its male athletes over its female athletes. It has its most notable female, basketball coach Kim Mulkey, defending the school and disparaging those who spoke out against the sexual violence. But in its statement about the settlement, the university contends that the new leadership is committed to change.
And now we have the commissioner of the Big 12 contributing to the culture of denial by dancing around the issue at media days this week.
Still awaiting Baylor: two more lawsuits against the Baptist university which involved a total of 15 plaintiffs; the results of the NCAA's (very late to the game) investigation; and the conference's "verification"--not an investigation--that BU is implementing the 100+ recommendations from the Pepper Hamilton report. (The university is being denied 25% of the revenues it would earn from being in the Big 12 until the verification process is complete.)
* The more: McCaw has been in the headlines because he was recently subpoenaed in one of the remaining lawsuits. The high and mighty tone is off-putting. He said he resigned--after he was placed on probation in 2016--because he did not want to be part of a cover-up. Except he was already part of a cover-up--because there is no way he did not know what was going on in his football program.
He said the report of findings (2016) in which the football program was deemed responsible for many of the problems of sexual violence was steeped in racism and that the regents were looking for scapegoats.
I do not doubt that there is rampant racism at Baylor, including in its athletics department; because there is rampant racism in intercollegiate sports. I do not doubt--in fact I have written about this already--that the regents are part of the problem. And it is a problem that their role has not been investigated and interrogated.
And though McCaw took some responsibility for his role, this testimony read like a shunned person seeking retribution. If there was such a problem with racism in athletics and the school in general, why wasn't McCaw working to address it? He was not the most powerful person (as he came to realize), but he could taken steps. And if he felt the whole system was so corrupt, why didn't he resign earlier? I am not sure what effect his testimony will have on the lawsuits, but it has invigorated others looking to pass the buck.
Briles's attorneys have jumped on this testimony saying that the school threw the former coach under the proverbial bus. First, he deserved to be fired for reasons too great to even list. Second, if he was surprised that he--a successful white, male DI football coach was expendable, that he could be used as a pawn to mitigate the effects of a huge scandal, then he really is not knowledgeable about the system which created and then ultimately tossed him aside. Because once in a great while even powerful white men in intercollegiate athletics are sacrificed to keep the system going. Neither Briles nor McCraw should be shocked by this; they helped perpetuate it.
Monday, July 02, 2018
Advocates Petition for Correction of 2017 Dear Colleague Letter
Several Title IX advocacy organizations have teamed up to petition the Department of Education to correct several unsupported factual assertions contained in its 2017 Dear Colleague Letter withdrawing the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter. They also argue that the 2017 Dear Colleague Letter, thus rendered baseless, should be rescinded.
The advocates' petition relies on federal law called the Information Quality Act which, along with related regulatory guidance, requires that information disseminated by federal agencies be useful, accurate, reliable, and unbiased. The statute does not provide for a private right of action. Instead, the mechanism for enforcement is to seek correction from the agency.
Specifically, the advocates singled out the following statements in the 2017 Letter for being unsupported by evidence, implausible, and biased.
While many agencies--the EPA for instance--receive many requests for correction, the Department of Education does not often receive them. So past practice is no basis for predicting how seriously the agency will take this request. Still, it seems unlikely that the Department of Education would change course in any meaningful way on the basis of this petition. The 2017 Dear Colleague Letter is supposed to be a temporary placeholder anyway, until the Department proposes new regulations. My guess is that the dispute over these "facts" is going to merge into the dispute over the basis for those newly proposed regulations.
Still, this effort is useful, not only to administrative law professors like me, who love examples of the lesser-known requirements of regulatory process, but for its contributions to the foundation of the policy debate that is about to occur. Advocates are warning the Department that there is evidence out there that it needs to contend with as it tries to rationalize whatever new regulations it eventually proposes. And they are suggesting that vague and imprecise generalizations about supposed problems are not going to hold water when it comes time for the agency to defend those newly proposed regulations against charges that they are arbitrary and capricious. The agency is taking its time releasing the draft regulations, but advocates are not waiting to stake out some of their key positions.
The advocates' petition relies on federal law called the Information Quality Act which, along with related regulatory guidance, requires that information disseminated by federal agencies be useful, accurate, reliable, and unbiased. The statute does not provide for a private right of action. Instead, the mechanism for enforcement is to seek correction from the agency.
Specifically, the advocates singled out the following statements in the 2017 Letter for being unsupported by evidence, implausible, and biased.
1.“Many schools [before the Prior Guidance] had traditionally employed a higher clear and convincing evidence standard.”Some of the advocates' objection centered on the use of the vague word "many" -- which, they argue, indicates a majority of either the 100,000+ federally-funded educational institutions, or at least, most of the 7000+ institutions of higher education. In fact, the best evidence out there suggests only a handful of schools used the clear and convincing evidence standard or reserved the right to appeal for accused students. The letter also cites empirical research finding that schools more often have procedures that are stacked against complainants rather than accused.
2.“Many schools had previously followed procedures reserving appeal for accused students.”
3.“As a result [of the Prior Guidance], many schools have established procedures for resolving allegations that lack the most basic elements of fairness and due process.”
4.“As a result [of the Prior Guidance], many schools have established procedures for resolving allegations that ... are overwhelmingly stacked against the accused.”
5. The Prior Guidance “led to the deprivation of rights for many students--both accused students denied fair process and victims denied an adequate resolution of their complaints.”
6.The Prior Guidance “has not succeeded ... in leading institutions to guarantee educational opportunities on the equal basis that Title IX requires.”
While many agencies--the EPA for instance--receive many requests for correction, the Department of Education does not often receive them. So past practice is no basis for predicting how seriously the agency will take this request. Still, it seems unlikely that the Department of Education would change course in any meaningful way on the basis of this petition. The 2017 Dear Colleague Letter is supposed to be a temporary placeholder anyway, until the Department proposes new regulations. My guess is that the dispute over these "facts" is going to merge into the dispute over the basis for those newly proposed regulations.
Still, this effort is useful, not only to administrative law professors like me, who love examples of the lesser-known requirements of regulatory process, but for its contributions to the foundation of the policy debate that is about to occur. Advocates are warning the Department that there is evidence out there that it needs to contend with as it tries to rationalize whatever new regulations it eventually proposes. And they are suggesting that vague and imprecise generalizations about supposed problems are not going to hold water when it comes time for the agency to defend those newly proposed regulations against charges that they are arbitrary and capricious. The agency is taking its time releasing the draft regulations, but advocates are not waiting to stake out some of their key positions.
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