The pregnancy discrimination complaint against Manhattan Community College (part of the CUNY system) has reportedly settled. The complaint, as we blogged about in January, was filed with the Department of Education by the National Women's Law Center on behalf of student Stephanie Stewart. It alleged that the college violated Title IX when it refused to allow Stewart any accommodation to make up for classes or assignments missed due to her pregnancy, and then penalized her, by revoking her scholarship, when she withdrew from the class. While the failure to allow make-ups may or may not be discriminatory (depending on whether students are allowed makeup for other medical reasons), the revocation of her scholarship as a consequence of withdrawal appears to me to violate the Title IX regulation that requires schools to permit students to take leaves of absence for medically-necessary reasons related to pregnancy and childbirth with no change of status when they return.
Under the terms of the settlement, Stewart's scholarship has been reinstated. She will also receive $3000 in damages.
Showing posts with label CUNY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CUNY. Show all posts
Monday, May 06, 2013
Saturday, January 19, 2013
Pregnancy Discrimination Alleged at Borough of Manhattan Community College
The National Women's Law Center filed a complaint this week, urging the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights to investigate its claim that the Borough of Manhattan Community College -- part of the CUNY system -- discriminated against a student, Stephanie Stewart, on the basis of her pregnancy. Stewart, an honors student, says a professor told her she would not be able to make up any tests or
assignments missed as a result of her pregnancy, including
any she might miss during labor and delivery. Deans and other college officials backed up the professor's decision and advised her to drop the course -- ironically, it was a course called Roles of Women -- since she expected to give birth during the semester, which she did. By withdrawing from the class, however, Stewart became ineligible for the merit scholarship she had been awarded.
Title IX regulations clarify that the statute's prohibition on sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. Schools must treat pregnancy and childbirth "as a justification for a leave of absence for so long a period of time as is deemed medically necessary by the student's physician, at the conclusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status which she held when the leave began." Though Stewart wasn't requesting a leave of absence, the opportunity to make up and exam or assignment could easily be viewed as a similar, or "lesser included," accommodation that should be governed by this same regulatory provision. The professor and the college should have granted the accommodation, asking only for Stewart to make up any missed work as soon as she is medically able.
If OCR agrees, and NWLC's allegations prove true, BMCC might be required to reinstate Stewart's scholarship and develop better policies for dealing with pregnant students.
Title IX regulations clarify that the statute's prohibition on sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. Schools must treat pregnancy and childbirth "as a justification for a leave of absence for so long a period of time as is deemed medically necessary by the student's physician, at the conclusion of which the student shall be reinstated to the status which she held when the leave began." Though Stewart wasn't requesting a leave of absence, the opportunity to make up and exam or assignment could easily be viewed as a similar, or "lesser included," accommodation that should be governed by this same regulatory provision. The professor and the college should have granted the accommodation, asking only for Stewart to make up any missed work as soon as she is medically able.
If OCR agrees, and NWLC's allegations prove true, BMCC might be required to reinstate Stewart's scholarship and develop better policies for dealing with pregnant students.
Saturday, September 15, 2007
College Need Not Recognize Men-Only Fraternity
On Thursday the Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a lower court's injunction that had barred CUNY from enforcing its gender nondiscrimination policy against a fraternity.
The College of Staten Island, part of the CUNY system, requires student clubs seeking official recognition to agree not to discriminate on the basis of sex. A recognized student club is entitled to use College facilities and services, in contrast to an unrecognized club, which may exist but is not eligible for such privileges. The College turned down Chi Iota, a Jewish fraternity, for official recognition because it excludes women from membership. The fraternity challenged this decision, and a lower court enjoined the College from withholding recognition to the fraternity. Specifically, it held that the College's policy infringes on the fraternity's First Amendment rights as an expressive association. (Title IX is not implicated in this case because the statute expressly excludes fraternities and sororities from its scope. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(6)).
The Second Circuit disagreed, reasoning that some restrictions on an expressive association are permissible, so long as they don't unreasonably infringe on the organization's strongly-held interest in associating with an exclusive membership.
First, the court reasoned that the fraternity did not have a strong interest in exclusivity. Its "broad, public-minded goals" -- including promoting respect for “the traditional values of men’s college social fraternities, community service, and the expression of Jewish culture" -- "do not depend for their promotion on close-knit bonds." While fraternity brothers may seek to form "deep attachments and commitments" and share "a community of thoughts, experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their lives," the "same can be said of nearly any student group in which members become close friends." The court also considered the fact that the fraternity is otherwise an inclusive organization (one needn't be Jewish to join) and the fact that it regularly includes women in its social activities as evidence that its claimed associational interest in restrictive membership is relatively weak. (Tangentially, I think the court's close examination of the organization's purpose is more evidence that the deference the Supreme Court extended to the Boy Scouts to determine whether its purpose was compitable with its exclusion of an openly gay scoutmaster was erroneous and appropriately confined to that particular case.)
Second, it was significant to the court that the College's policy does not prohibit the fraternity from existing on campus, it merely denies them official recognition and the use of college facilities and services. "[The College's] refusal to subsidize the Fraternity’s activities does not constitute a substantial imposition on the group’s associational freedom." The court also considered the College's compelling interest in ensuring that its resources are equally available to all its students.
It will be interesting to see whether more colleges and universities chose not to officially sanction fraternities and sororities in light of this decision. Significantly, the decision does not threaten the existence of single-sex fraternities and sororities. It merely affirms that the scope of private discrimination is, appropriately, kept private.
The College of Staten Island, part of the CUNY system, requires student clubs seeking official recognition to agree not to discriminate on the basis of sex. A recognized student club is entitled to use College facilities and services, in contrast to an unrecognized club, which may exist but is not eligible for such privileges. The College turned down Chi Iota, a Jewish fraternity, for official recognition because it excludes women from membership. The fraternity challenged this decision, and a lower court enjoined the College from withholding recognition to the fraternity. Specifically, it held that the College's policy infringes on the fraternity's First Amendment rights as an expressive association. (Title IX is not implicated in this case because the statute expressly excludes fraternities and sororities from its scope. 20 U.S.C. 1681(a)(6)).
The Second Circuit disagreed, reasoning that some restrictions on an expressive association are permissible, so long as they don't unreasonably infringe on the organization's strongly-held interest in associating with an exclusive membership.
First, the court reasoned that the fraternity did not have a strong interest in exclusivity. Its "broad, public-minded goals" -- including promoting respect for “the traditional values of men’s college social fraternities, community service, and the expression of Jewish culture" -- "do not depend for their promotion on close-knit bonds." While fraternity brothers may seek to form "deep attachments and commitments" and share "a community of thoughts, experiences, beliefs and distinctly personal aspects of their lives," the "same can be said of nearly any student group in which members become close friends." The court also considered the fact that the fraternity is otherwise an inclusive organization (one needn't be Jewish to join) and the fact that it regularly includes women in its social activities as evidence that its claimed associational interest in restrictive membership is relatively weak. (Tangentially, I think the court's close examination of the organization's purpose is more evidence that the deference the Supreme Court extended to the Boy Scouts to determine whether its purpose was compitable with its exclusion of an openly gay scoutmaster was erroneous and appropriately confined to that particular case.)
Second, it was significant to the court that the College's policy does not prohibit the fraternity from existing on campus, it merely denies them official recognition and the use of college facilities and services. "[The College's] refusal to subsidize the Fraternity’s activities does not constitute a substantial imposition on the group’s associational freedom." The court also considered the College's compelling interest in ensuring that its resources are equally available to all its students.
It will be interesting to see whether more colleges and universities chose not to officially sanction fraternities and sororities in light of this decision. Significantly, the decision does not threaten the existence of single-sex fraternities and sororities. It merely affirms that the scope of private discrimination is, appropriately, kept private.
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