Last year when a jury ruled in favor of Shannon Miller in her lawsuit against University of Minnesota-Duluth, it awarded her nearly $3.75 million in compensation for past damages after it concluded that the university terminated her with unlawful retaliatory and discriminatory motives in violation of Title IX and Title VII.
Left unresolved at the time was how the university should remedy her present and future injury of present and future remedy, which Miller argued should be addressed by an order requiring the university to reinstate her to her former position. In the alternative, she argued for a a front pay award of $3 million. A federal court judge ruled on her motion this week. He determined that reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy due to the position having already been filled. The current coach is now in her fourth season and most of the current players have been recruited by her. Accordingly, it would be unduly disruptive to reinstate Miller to her former position. Instead, the court agreed to a monetary alternative in the form of front pay.
Front pay is an award of damages that in unlawful termination cases that requires the factfinder to determine what the plaintiff would earn from the date of the verdict going forward if they had not been fired (back pay, in contrast, compensates the plaintiff through the date of the verdict). It then takes into account what the plaintiff is earning in whatever new job they may have, and if that is less, awards the plaintiff the difference. The court did not agree with Miller's speculation that she would have worked at UMD for 12-15 more years from the date of verdict; pointing out that 30-year tenure for any Division I head coach is rare. But nor did the court accept UMD's position that Miller was fully compensated by the back pay award Miller had already been awarded. Instead, the judge found sufficient evidence that Miller would have worked at UMD for another five years from when she was terminated. Her front pay award was therefore calculated at her UMD salary from the date of the verdict through June 2020. Then it was offset by the $30,000 Miller earns annually as the head coach of the Calgary Inferno professional women's hockey team. The total, $461,278, brings UMD's total liability to around $4.2 million.
One thing that I found noteworthy about this opinion is the particular role that Title IX played, relative to Title VII, in driving the damages award in this case. The judge's opinion on front pay noted that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages or reinstatement on her Title VII claim, even though the jury found that sex discrimination had been a motivating factor in her termination, because the jury had found evidence that UMD would have fired Miller anyway. Under Title VII, a so-called "mixed motive" finding like this limits the plaintiff to only declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. Title IX, however, is not governed by the mixed-motive provision of Title VII, so damages are allowed even when university defendants demonstrate that a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason would have led them to make the same adverse employment action.
Decision: Miller v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 2019 WL 586674 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2019).
Showing posts with label employment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label employment. Show all posts
Friday, February 15, 2019
Tuesday, July 31, 2018
Court Denies Motion to Dismiss Lawsuit Challenging SUNY Albany's Termination of Women's Tennis
After SUNY Albany cut its women's tennis team in 2016, several former players, along with the team's coach, Gordon Graham, sued the university alleging discrimination in violation of Title IX. Last week, a federal court in New York denied the university's motion to dismiss Graham's claims that the decision amounted to sex discrimination against him, while also denying the former players' motion for summary judgment in their favor.
In its motion to dismiss Graham's claim, the university argued that terminating the women's tennis team could not in any way be considered sex discrimination against Graham, a male coach. But the court disagreed. While it's true that the university's decision to cut the women's tennis team was not motivated by Graham's sex, it may have been motivated by the sex of the athletes on the team. This act of alleged sex discrimination injured Graham as well, by costing him his job, making it actionable injury under Title IX, the court reasoned. Graham adequately alleged an act of sex discrimination, and he alleged that the act in question caused him harm.
As for the players' motion, they argued that because in 2017 OCR found SUNY Albany's decision to eliminate women's tennis violated Title IX, there was no issue of fact requiring litigation, permitting the court to rule in their favor early in the litigation process prior to trial or even the taking of discovery. The court disagreed with this argument as well, concluding that the agency's findings could not make the university automatically liable as a matter of law. The university did not challenge the agency's findings, but instead, agreed to resolve in them without the benefit of adjudication, and in an agreement that specifically disclaimed any admission of liability. Thus, the court ruled, the university should at least have the chance to enter evidence that could potentially demonstrate that a disproportionate balance of athletic opportunities nevertheless complies with Title IX. I believe that the former players still have a very strong case, since cutting a viable team is usually strong evidence of unmet interest of the underrepresented sex. But also, it made sense for the court to insist that they make their case based on a record produced during litigation, rather than automatically import the findings of OCR.
Pejovic, v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 2018 WL 3614169 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018).
In its motion to dismiss Graham's claim, the university argued that terminating the women's tennis team could not in any way be considered sex discrimination against Graham, a male coach. But the court disagreed. While it's true that the university's decision to cut the women's tennis team was not motivated by Graham's sex, it may have been motivated by the sex of the athletes on the team. This act of alleged sex discrimination injured Graham as well, by costing him his job, making it actionable injury under Title IX, the court reasoned. Graham adequately alleged an act of sex discrimination, and he alleged that the act in question caused him harm.
As for the players' motion, they argued that because in 2017 OCR found SUNY Albany's decision to eliminate women's tennis violated Title IX, there was no issue of fact requiring litigation, permitting the court to rule in their favor early in the litigation process prior to trial or even the taking of discovery. The court disagreed with this argument as well, concluding that the agency's findings could not make the university automatically liable as a matter of law. The university did not challenge the agency's findings, but instead, agreed to resolve in them without the benefit of adjudication, and in an agreement that specifically disclaimed any admission of liability. Thus, the court ruled, the university should at least have the chance to enter evidence that could potentially demonstrate that a disproportionate balance of athletic opportunities nevertheless complies with Title IX. I believe that the former players still have a very strong case, since cutting a viable team is usually strong evidence of unmet interest of the underrepresented sex. But also, it made sense for the court to insist that they make their case based on a record produced during litigation, rather than automatically import the findings of OCR.
Pejovic, v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 2018 WL 3614169 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018).
Thursday, March 15, 2018
Jury Awards Coach Shannon Miller $3.74 Million
A federal court jury in Minnesota determined today that the University of Minnesota-Duluth was motivated by sex discrimination and retaliation when it decided not to renew the contract of former women's hockey coach Shannon Miller. As a result, the university violated Title IX and is liable for $3.74 million in damages. This figure includes $744,000 to cover Miller's past lost wages and $3 million to compensate for her emotional distress.
Though the university argued that Miller was not renewed for performance reasons, Miller's presented evidence that convinced the jury that she was actually let go because she was a strong advocate for her team and that that athletic department employed double standards when making employment decisions about male and female coaches.
Some of our past blog posts about this case are here, here, and here.
Though the university argued that Miller was not renewed for performance reasons, Miller's presented evidence that convinced the jury that she was actually let go because she was a strong advocate for her team and that that athletic department employed double standards when making employment decisions about male and female coaches.
Some of our past blog posts about this case are here, here, and here.
Saturday, February 24, 2018
Wichita State VP Claims Retaliation for Investigating Campus Rape
Earlier this month the federal district court in Kansas ruled on Wichita State University's motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by Wade Robinson, its former Vice President for Campus Life and University Relations. Robinson had sued the university after he was fired, alleging that the university took this and other adverse action against him in retaliation for his efforts to investigate incidents of rape reported to his office, including a rape allegedly committed by a member of the university's basketball team.
The court denied the university's motion to dismiss most of Robinson's suit and concluded that his complaint satisfactorily alleges the elements of a retaliation claim under Title IX. The element disputed in this case is the requirement that a retaliation plaintiff allege that he engaged in conduct protected by the statute. Generally such protected conduct may include advocating internally for Title IX compliance. However, when Title IX compliance is part of one's job duties, efforts to internal secure compliance do not count as protected conduct. Yet, Robinson's complaint included allegations that his Title IX advocacy had gone beyond the scope of his job as the court explained:
Robinson v. Wichita State Univ., 2018 WL 836294 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2018).
The court denied the university's motion to dismiss most of Robinson's suit and concluded that his complaint satisfactorily alleges the elements of a retaliation claim under Title IX. The element disputed in this case is the requirement that a retaliation plaintiff allege that he engaged in conduct protected by the statute. Generally such protected conduct may include advocating internally for Title IX compliance. However, when Title IX compliance is part of one's job duties, efforts to internal secure compliance do not count as protected conduct. Yet, Robinson's complaint included allegations that his Title IX advocacy had gone beyond the scope of his job as the court explained:
Had the Complaint in this case merely alleged that plaintiff warned WSU that it could face liability for failing to investigate alleged sexual assaults, the court might enter judgment against plaintiff on Count I. ... But here, the Complaint alleges substantially more than that. It alleges that plaintiff started two investigations and filed a complaint. The Complaint thus sufficiently alleges that plaintiff crossed the line from being an employee merely performing his job as Title IX compliance overseer and actively assisted others in asserting Title IX rights.... These allegations preclude the court from applying the manager rule to plaintiff’s claim and thus preclude judgment on the pleadings.The court also denied the university president's motion to dismiss Robinson's due process claim against him (though it did dismiss some state law claims). That means the retaliation and due process claims will proceed to the discovery phase of litigation and, barring settlement or summary judgment, eventually to trial. Yet regardless of what happens to this case moving forward, administrators working on Title IX issues will find this preliminary ruling helpful and reassuring on the question of what constitutes protected conduct as a matter of law.
Robinson v. Wichita State Univ., 2018 WL 836294 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2018).
Tuesday, February 06, 2018
University of Minnesota-Duluth to Face Trial on Coach's Sex Discrimination and Retaliation Claims
Last week the federal district court in Minnesota ruled on the University of Minnesota's motion for summary judgment in a multi-count lawsuit filed against it by three female former coaches at the Duluth campus, who had alleged a variety of discrimination claims arising from their employment. Though the court granted summary judgment on several of the plaintiffs' claims, it refused to dismiss Coach Shannon Miller's claim that sex discrimination motivated the university's decision not to renew her contract, and her claim that the university retaliated against her for raising Title IX concerns. Those issues are now heading for trial scheduled in March.
Sex discrimination. UMD defended its decision not to renew Miller's contract on two grounds: the poor performance of the women's hockey team, which Miller coached, and the lack of "return on investment" for continuing to pay Miller's relatively high salary. Yet the court acknowledged, there is sufficient evidence that jury could conclude that these explanations were in fact pretext for sex discrimination. Specifically, the court identified: (1) evidence that the men's hockey coach was retained comparable or worse performance of his team; (2) evidence that the department used different criteria to evaluate Miller's renewal than the renewal of the men's team's coach; (3) the fact that the department gave inconsistent explanations for Miller's nonrenewal (saying first it was because of finances, then later arguing it was based on performance); evidence that the university's financial situation "was not as dire as it claimed"; and (5) the fact that the department did not pursue alternatives to nonrenewal that would have been consistent its ostensible concern about finances, such as asking Miller to take a pay cut or seeking donors to fund her salary.
Retaliation. The court also concluded there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could conclude that the university had retaliatory motives, in addition or instead of a desire to get rid of Miller because of her sex. Miller engaged in protected conduct by complaining to athletic department administrators about Title IX violations that affected her team. These complaints "continued until shortly before" the athletic director decided not to renew her contract. This timing, along with other evidence, could convince the jury that UMD terminated Miller to punish her for advocating for Title IX.
Hostile Environment Based on Sexual Orientation. The court dismissed the claims of all three plaintiffs that the athletic department cultivated and tolerated a hostile environment on the grounds that they are lesbians. After acknowledging that these claims were "strong" the court nevertheless dismissed them on the grounds that federal law does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. (While Minnesota law does prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, the court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over these state law claims.) This seems like an appealable issue to me. The nearby Seventh Circuit has reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, and other circuit courts may be on the verge. An appeal here could give the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to get on board with this emerging and civil-rights expanding interpretation of sex discrimination under Title VII and Title IX.
Equal Pay. The court also dismissed Coach Miller's Equal Pay Act claim. Even though she was paid less than her men's team counterpart, a male, the court nevertheless determined that his job was not comparable to hers because the men's hockey team draws a bigger audience, more revenue, and as a result puts more pressure on him to win. This outcome is disappointing but not surprising as other female coaches' equal pay act claims have failed due to judges' unwillingness to see equivalence between coaching women and coaching men. Unfortunately, the rationale permits sex discrimination in the marketplace to justify lower salaries for female coaches who work just as hard and have no control over the public's bias.
Decision is: Miller v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 2018 WL 659851 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2018).
Sex discrimination. UMD defended its decision not to renew Miller's contract on two grounds: the poor performance of the women's hockey team, which Miller coached, and the lack of "return on investment" for continuing to pay Miller's relatively high salary. Yet the court acknowledged, there is sufficient evidence that jury could conclude that these explanations were in fact pretext for sex discrimination. Specifically, the court identified: (1) evidence that the men's hockey coach was retained comparable or worse performance of his team; (2) evidence that the department used different criteria to evaluate Miller's renewal than the renewal of the men's team's coach; (3) the fact that the department gave inconsistent explanations for Miller's nonrenewal (saying first it was because of finances, then later arguing it was based on performance); evidence that the university's financial situation "was not as dire as it claimed"; and (5) the fact that the department did not pursue alternatives to nonrenewal that would have been consistent its ostensible concern about finances, such as asking Miller to take a pay cut or seeking donors to fund her salary.
Retaliation. The court also concluded there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could conclude that the university had retaliatory motives, in addition or instead of a desire to get rid of Miller because of her sex. Miller engaged in protected conduct by complaining to athletic department administrators about Title IX violations that affected her team. These complaints "continued until shortly before" the athletic director decided not to renew her contract. This timing, along with other evidence, could convince the jury that UMD terminated Miller to punish her for advocating for Title IX.
Hostile Environment Based on Sexual Orientation. The court dismissed the claims of all three plaintiffs that the athletic department cultivated and tolerated a hostile environment on the grounds that they are lesbians. After acknowledging that these claims were "strong" the court nevertheless dismissed them on the grounds that federal law does not expressly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. (While Minnesota law does prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, the court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over these state law claims.) This seems like an appealable issue to me. The nearby Seventh Circuit has reasoned that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination, and other circuit courts may be on the verge. An appeal here could give the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals an opportunity to get on board with this emerging and civil-rights expanding interpretation of sex discrimination under Title VII and Title IX.
Equal Pay. The court also dismissed Coach Miller's Equal Pay Act claim. Even though she was paid less than her men's team counterpart, a male, the court nevertheless determined that his job was not comparable to hers because the men's hockey team draws a bigger audience, more revenue, and as a result puts more pressure on him to win. This outcome is disappointing but not surprising as other female coaches' equal pay act claims have failed due to judges' unwillingness to see equivalence between coaching women and coaching men. Unfortunately, the rationale permits sex discrimination in the marketplace to justify lower salaries for female coaches who work just as hard and have no control over the public's bias.
Decision is: Miller v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 2018 WL 659851 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2018).
Thursday, February 01, 2018
Community College Coaches Challenge Gender Pay Disparity
Three female coaches in California recently filed a lawsuit against the State Center Community College District to challenge gender discrimination in pay and job responsibilities that affect them as coaches at colleges operated by the District. One of the plaintiffs, Rhonda Williams, is head coach of the Fresno City College women's softball team and assistant coach of its golf team, while two others, Kathleen Kuball and Shannon Jeffries, coach at Reedley College in softball and volleyball respectively. They allege that while they have comparable or even more job responsibilities than their male counterparts, they are paid less because the District calculates compensation based on the number of "duty days" each coach is assigned and then assigning female coaches fewer duty days. They allege that this practice is a part of an overall pattern of discrimination against the women's sports programs in the District. The complaint alleges that this discrimination affects female athletes as well, and that it constitutes a violation of Title IX as well as state law.
These coaches join a growing list of others who have used Title IX and other related law (state law, Equal Pay Act, Title VII) to challenge discriminatory conditions in their employment. In fact, it was other coaches from Fresno -- at nearby Fresno State -- whose famously successful lawsuits in 2006-2007 kicked off what appears to the current trend of coaches going to court to fight for equality. Today, sex discrimination lawsuits filed by coaches are more common than those filed by athletes (probably because coaches incur more economic damages and hold their jobs for longer than students are athletes). Often, however, these lawsuits expose discriminatory practices that affect athletes and can lead to systemic change.
These coaches join a growing list of others who have used Title IX and other related law (state law, Equal Pay Act, Title VII) to challenge discriminatory conditions in their employment. In fact, it was other coaches from Fresno -- at nearby Fresno State -- whose famously successful lawsuits in 2006-2007 kicked off what appears to the current trend of coaches going to court to fight for equality. Today, sex discrimination lawsuits filed by coaches are more common than those filed by athletes (probably because coaches incur more economic damages and hold their jobs for longer than students are athletes). Often, however, these lawsuits expose discriminatory practices that affect athletes and can lead to systemic change.
Tuesday, November 21, 2017
Oklahoma Jury Awards Transgender Professor $1.1 Million in Tenure-Denial Discrimination Suit
In 2015 we blogged about a lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice on behalf of a transgender professor, Rachel Tudor, who was denied tenure by her institution Southeastern Oklahoma State University. At the time, we found it noteworthy that DOJ was taking the position that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination necessarily includes discrimination that targets someone for their transgender status, and we noted that a favorable outcome in this case would benefit transgender litigants under Title IX as well.
2015 seems like a bygone era when it comes to the government's enforcement of civil rights, so it is particularly heartening to report that yesterday a jury of eight Oklahomans found in Tudor's favor and awarded her $1.165 million in damages. They reportedly found that the University was liable on three counts: denying Tudor the opportunity to apply for tenure in 2009-10 because of her gender, denying her again the following year because of her gender, and retaliating against her after she complained about workplace discrimination.
This really is a big deal. A member of Tudor's legal team noted that this is the first transgender discrimination case under Title VII to make it to a jury trial. For her to win -- bigly -- in court that drew its jurors from a state not exactly known for being progressive on LGBT rights, shows that the law and culture are both shifting in favor of a necessary and expansive view of civil rights.
2015 seems like a bygone era when it comes to the government's enforcement of civil rights, so it is particularly heartening to report that yesterday a jury of eight Oklahomans found in Tudor's favor and awarded her $1.165 million in damages. They reportedly found that the University was liable on three counts: denying Tudor the opportunity to apply for tenure in 2009-10 because of her gender, denying her again the following year because of her gender, and retaliating against her after she complained about workplace discrimination.
This really is a big deal. A member of Tudor's legal team noted that this is the first transgender discrimination case under Title VII to make it to a jury trial. For her to win -- bigly -- in court that drew its jurors from a state not exactly known for being progressive on LGBT rights, shows that the law and culture are both shifting in favor of a necessary and expansive view of civil rights.
Monday, July 03, 2017
Litigation Roundup: School Districts Lacking Notice
In several recent cases, courts rejected claims that school districts were liable for sexual misconduct by employees or students due to lack of notice. Here are case summaries:
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's judgment in favor of a plaintiff who sued the South San Antonio Independent School District after having been molested by the vice principal, later principal, of the elementary school he attended. After the jury awarded the plaintiff $4.5 million, the school district moved to dismiss the case as a matter of law and appealed an adverse ruling on this motion to the appellate court. A school district is liable for sexual misconduct of its employees if someone with authority to take corrective action has notice of the misconduct and responds with deliberate indifference. In this case, the plaintiff argued that because the perpetrator was the vice principal -- someone with authority to take corrective action -- then the notice requirement was satisfied. However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the perpetrator's knowledge of his own misconduct does not qualify. The notice requirement is meant to limit school district liability to only those cases where those in authority ignore sexual misconduct that they know is going on, and one does not "ignore" one's own misconduct. Put another way, the court reasoned that implicit in the notice requirement is a requirement that the person to whom notice is given is a person who does not already know that the misconduct is going on. Otherwise, there is potential automatic liability every time someone with authority is the perpetrator.
Decision: Salazar v. South San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 2590511 (5th Cir. June 15, 2017).
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's decision to dismiss Title IX claims filed against Bibb County (Georgia) school district stemming from the rape of a female special education student, the plaintiff in the case. The facts are terrible: A male student walked into the plaintiff's classroom and told the teacher that another teacher wanted to see the plaintiff. The teacher let her go with him, and he brought her to the bathroom where she was gang-raped by seven male students, none of whom had ever been reported for any kind of sexual misconduct. For the district to be liable for the rape, however, there must be some prior misconduct that put school officials on notice that the plaintiff was at risk for what happened. Considering the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that she herself had reported prior incidents, nor that the perpetrators themselves had been the subject of such reports. Still, however, there must be a reasonable enough similarity between the prior incidents and the plaintiff's rape to put school officials on notice, and the appellate court agreed with the district court that such similarity was lacking here. There had been prior incidents of sexual assault in the high school; one of which did not involve students in the special education program and so could not serve as notice that students participating in that program were at an elevated risk. The other did involve special education students, but the circumstances were different as the students involved had been left alone unsupervised in a classroom, whereas here, the perpetrators used deceit to extract the victim from her classroom. Therefore, there was nothing on which to base a claim that the school district should have acted to prevent the rape that occurred here.
Decision: Jane Doe v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 2240825 (11th Cir. May 22, 2017).
The parents of an eighth grader can not pursue their lawsuit against the Independent School District of Delaware County (Oklahoma) that stems from a romantic and sexual relationship that occurred between their ninth-grade daughter and her basketball coach, an employee of the district. The federal district court in Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the district on the parents' Title IX claim because their were no allegations that the school district was indifferent to the coach's sexual misconduct that was known to appropriate school officials. Once the principal learned of a rumor that the coach and the student had been locked in a room together, he and the superintendent investigated and quickly got corroboration by the student. The coach was suspended immediately and eventually terminated. The parents argued that school officials actually had notice that this coach posed a threat of sexual misconduct to his players based on prior complaints that a couple of parents had made against the coach. However, these complaints, which were investigated, did not involve conduct that was predictive of the sexual misconduct that occurred in this case. There had been a complaint that the coach sometimes texted individual players, and sometimes talked about butts in practice. But the investigation revealed that the texts and the comments were related to basketball and reasonably handled by an order to the coach not to text individual players any more. In the absence of deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct that was known or foreseeable to school officials the school district was not liable for damages arising from the the coach's sexual misconduct with the plaintiffs' daughter.
Decision: Callihan v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1., 2017 WL 2783990 (N.D. Okla. June 27, 2017).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court's judgment in favor of a plaintiff who sued the South San Antonio Independent School District after having been molested by the vice principal, later principal, of the elementary school he attended. After the jury awarded the plaintiff $4.5 million, the school district moved to dismiss the case as a matter of law and appealed an adverse ruling on this motion to the appellate court. A school district is liable for sexual misconduct of its employees if someone with authority to take corrective action has notice of the misconduct and responds with deliberate indifference. In this case, the plaintiff argued that because the perpetrator was the vice principal -- someone with authority to take corrective action -- then the notice requirement was satisfied. However, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the perpetrator's knowledge of his own misconduct does not qualify. The notice requirement is meant to limit school district liability to only those cases where those in authority ignore sexual misconduct that they know is going on, and one does not "ignore" one's own misconduct. Put another way, the court reasoned that implicit in the notice requirement is a requirement that the person to whom notice is given is a person who does not already know that the misconduct is going on. Otherwise, there is potential automatic liability every time someone with authority is the perpetrator.
Decision: Salazar v. South San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 2590511 (5th Cir. June 15, 2017).
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's decision to dismiss Title IX claims filed against Bibb County (Georgia) school district stemming from the rape of a female special education student, the plaintiff in the case. The facts are terrible: A male student walked into the plaintiff's classroom and told the teacher that another teacher wanted to see the plaintiff. The teacher let her go with him, and he brought her to the bathroom where she was gang-raped by seven male students, none of whom had ever been reported for any kind of sexual misconduct. For the district to be liable for the rape, however, there must be some prior misconduct that put school officials on notice that the plaintiff was at risk for what happened. Considering the appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to show that she herself had reported prior incidents, nor that the perpetrators themselves had been the subject of such reports. Still, however, there must be a reasonable enough similarity between the prior incidents and the plaintiff's rape to put school officials on notice, and the appellate court agreed with the district court that such similarity was lacking here. There had been prior incidents of sexual assault in the high school; one of which did not involve students in the special education program and so could not serve as notice that students participating in that program were at an elevated risk. The other did involve special education students, but the circumstances were different as the students involved had been left alone unsupervised in a classroom, whereas here, the perpetrators used deceit to extract the victim from her classroom. Therefore, there was nothing on which to base a claim that the school district should have acted to prevent the rape that occurred here.
Decision: Jane Doe v. Bibb County Sch. Dist., 2017 WL 2240825 (11th Cir. May 22, 2017).
The parents of an eighth grader can not pursue their lawsuit against the Independent School District of Delaware County (Oklahoma) that stems from a romantic and sexual relationship that occurred between their ninth-grade daughter and her basketball coach, an employee of the district. The federal district court in Oklahoma granted summary judgment to the district on the parents' Title IX claim because their were no allegations that the school district was indifferent to the coach's sexual misconduct that was known to appropriate school officials. Once the principal learned of a rumor that the coach and the student had been locked in a room together, he and the superintendent investigated and quickly got corroboration by the student. The coach was suspended immediately and eventually terminated. The parents argued that school officials actually had notice that this coach posed a threat of sexual misconduct to his players based on prior complaints that a couple of parents had made against the coach. However, these complaints, which were investigated, did not involve conduct that was predictive of the sexual misconduct that occurred in this case. There had been a complaint that the coach sometimes texted individual players, and sometimes talked about butts in practice. But the investigation revealed that the texts and the comments were related to basketball and reasonably handled by an order to the coach not to text individual players any more. In the absence of deliberate indifference to sexual misconduct that was known or foreseeable to school officials the school district was not liable for damages arising from the the coach's sexual misconduct with the plaintiffs' daughter.
Decision: Callihan v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1., 2017 WL 2783990 (N.D. Okla. June 27, 2017).
Monday, May 15, 2017
Iowa Verdict in Context
Earlier this month, former athletic administrator Jane Meyer won her case and a sizeable $1.43 million jury award against the University of Iowa. I was traveling out of the country when it happened and could not blog about it until now, but my delay in posting in no way detracts from what big news I think this is. Meyer sued the university for retaliation in violation of Title IX when she was transferred outside the department the day after she submitted a memo to the athletic director describing the sex discrimination she had experienced and witnessed within the department. Some of her grievances had to do with the athletic director's decision to reassign some of Meyer's responsibilities to a newly-created deputy AD, a position filled by a male who was paid $70,000 more than Meyer. Meyer also objected to the firing of female head coaches, including her own partner Tracey Griesbaum who lost her position at the helm of the university's field hockey team even though an internal investigation cleared her of the complaints of bullying and harassment for which she had been accused. (Griesbaum's own lawsuit against the university is still pending.)
The jury agreed that the university violated Meyer's civil rights and awarded her $374,000 for back pay, $444,000 for past emotional distress, and $612,000 for future emotional distress. She is reportedly seeking an additional $2 million in reimbursement for legal fees and in punitive damages which may be allowable based on the jury's finding that the university's violations were "willful."
Meyer is not the first veteran female leader in college athletics to challenge sex discrimination and retaliation within her department. Just last fall a jury in California awarded over $3 million to Beth Burns after seeing her university's stated reason for firing her as pretext for retaliation. In another recent example, the University of North Florida paid over a million to a terminated female coach last year. In the more distant past, we've blogged about jury awards and settlements for female coaches and administrators who endured retaliation and sex discrimination at Fresno State, Florida Gulf Coast University, Iowa State, and Cal-Berkeley, for example. Cases currently pending against Minnesota-Duluth and Griesbaum's case against Iowa could add to this list as well.
Together these cases remind us that even in this Title IX era, college athletics is a contentious workplace for female coaches and administrators. And when you consider that lawsuits are likely only filed when the plaintiff has nothing left to lose, it is easy to imagine that there are likely countless unknown other examples of discrimination that are almost as bad. When the media bemoans the dearth of female leadership in college athletics, these lawsuits hold some clues about many of the reasons why.
But the success of these plaintiffs also raise a critical question about how much litigation it will take to see athletic departments change their culture and behavior towards female coaches and administrators. Why wasn't Fresno State, for example, enough of a warning to prevent Iowa from repeating its pattern of mistakes? It's important that the Polk County, Iowa, jury sent a strong message to college and university athletic departments that retaliation and discrimination doesn't pay, but are other athletic departments getting the message?
The jury agreed that the university violated Meyer's civil rights and awarded her $374,000 for back pay, $444,000 for past emotional distress, and $612,000 for future emotional distress. She is reportedly seeking an additional $2 million in reimbursement for legal fees and in punitive damages which may be allowable based on the jury's finding that the university's violations were "willful."
Meyer is not the first veteran female leader in college athletics to challenge sex discrimination and retaliation within her department. Just last fall a jury in California awarded over $3 million to Beth Burns after seeing her university's stated reason for firing her as pretext for retaliation. In another recent example, the University of North Florida paid over a million to a terminated female coach last year. In the more distant past, we've blogged about jury awards and settlements for female coaches and administrators who endured retaliation and sex discrimination at Fresno State, Florida Gulf Coast University, Iowa State, and Cal-Berkeley, for example. Cases currently pending against Minnesota-Duluth and Griesbaum's case against Iowa could add to this list as well.
Together these cases remind us that even in this Title IX era, college athletics is a contentious workplace for female coaches and administrators. And when you consider that lawsuits are likely only filed when the plaintiff has nothing left to lose, it is easy to imagine that there are likely countless unknown other examples of discrimination that are almost as bad. When the media bemoans the dearth of female leadership in college athletics, these lawsuits hold some clues about many of the reasons why.
But the success of these plaintiffs also raise a critical question about how much litigation it will take to see athletic departments change their culture and behavior towards female coaches and administrators. Why wasn't Fresno State, for example, enough of a warning to prevent Iowa from repeating its pattern of mistakes? It's important that the Polk County, Iowa, jury sent a strong message to college and university athletic departments that retaliation and discrimination doesn't pay, but are other athletic departments getting the message?
Wednesday, April 05, 2017
Full Seventh Circuit Rules Sex Discrimination Includes Sexual Orientation Discrimination
Yesterday, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination. The case that gave rise to the ruling involved an openly-lesbian adjunct professor, Kim Hively, who taught at Ivy Tech Community College in South Bend, Indiana. She alleged that Ivy Tech rejected her applications for various full-time teaching positions and eventually terminated her adjunct status due to bias against her sexual orientation. She filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and other protected characteristics, but which does not provide express protection from discrimination due to sexual orientation. For this reason, a federal district court in Indiana dismissed her case. When she appealed to the Seventh Circuit, the three-judge panel that first heard her case agreed with the district court. But, the appellate court agreed to re-hear the case "en banc" with all judges participating. The full court's decision, which came out yesterday, reinstated Hivey's case and will allow her now to try to prove to the lower court that sexual orientation discrimination did in fact occur.
Even though Hively's case continues to be litigated, it has cleared a huge hurdle and in so doing, generated a significant appellate court decision on the relationship between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination. Sex discrimination is generally evident in the comparison between how an employer treats an employee of one sex versus how that employer treats another otherwise-identical employee of the other sex. Using this paradigm, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that when an employer treats positively a male employee who has a female partner (or who is attracted to women), but treats adversely a female employee who has a female partner (or who is attracted to women), that is discrimination on the basis of the employee's sex. Though the discrimination targets the fact that the victim of such discrimination is partnered with or attracted to a person of the same sex, i.e., their homosexual orientation, such discrimination "does not exist without taking the victim's... sex...into account." We already know that sex discrimination works in this relational way (discriminating on the basis of some characteristic, like the victim's attraction to women, in relation to the victim's sex), because the Supreme Court endorsed that way of thinking about sex discrimination when it confirmed that it encompassed gender stereotyping. An employer's adverse action towards a female employee who exhibits a certain characteristic or appearance, but not a male employee who does the same is discrimination "that does not exist without taking the victim's sex into account." Additionally, the court considered the Supreme Court's precedent in Loving v. Virginia, which ruled that a state law banning interracial marriage was race discrimination prohibited under the Constitution. If discrimination based on the race one is oriented to is race discrimination, then discrimination based on the sex one is oriented to is sex discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit decision is the first appellate court decision to employ this reasoning (for a lower court example, see Videckis v. Pepperdine, a Title IX case). Other appellate courts in the (sometimes distant) past have ruled against the gay or lesbian plaintiff on the grounds that Congress could have, but did not, include sexual orientation as a Title VII protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit's departure from this reasoning sets up a circuit split that gives the Supreme Court a reason to weigh in should it so choose. Although the court's decision interprets the sex discrimination provision in Title VII, it and any Supreme Court decision that affirms it, should there be one, will no doubt be influential in the Title IX context as well, since courts routinely refer to definitions of sex discrimination from Title VII cases when analyzing what it means under Title IX.
I also think this decision, though about sexual orientation, will help support the argument that sex discrimination includes discrimination on the basis of transgender status, since transgender discrimination also targets a characteristic relative to the person's sex. Discrimination against someone because their gender identity is not consonant with their birth-assigned sex is discrimination "that does not exist without taking the victim's sex into account." I would expect the Hively decision to be cited favorably by litigants challenging exclusion of transgender students and employees from gender-consonant restrooms and other manners of discrimination.
Even though Hively's case continues to be litigated, it has cleared a huge hurdle and in so doing, generated a significant appellate court decision on the relationship between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination. Sex discrimination is generally evident in the comparison between how an employer treats an employee of one sex versus how that employer treats another otherwise-identical employee of the other sex. Using this paradigm, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that when an employer treats positively a male employee who has a female partner (or who is attracted to women), but treats adversely a female employee who has a female partner (or who is attracted to women), that is discrimination on the basis of the employee's sex. Though the discrimination targets the fact that the victim of such discrimination is partnered with or attracted to a person of the same sex, i.e., their homosexual orientation, such discrimination "does not exist without taking the victim's... sex...into account." We already know that sex discrimination works in this relational way (discriminating on the basis of some characteristic, like the victim's attraction to women, in relation to the victim's sex), because the Supreme Court endorsed that way of thinking about sex discrimination when it confirmed that it encompassed gender stereotyping. An employer's adverse action towards a female employee who exhibits a certain characteristic or appearance, but not a male employee who does the same is discrimination "that does not exist without taking the victim's sex into account." Additionally, the court considered the Supreme Court's precedent in Loving v. Virginia, which ruled that a state law banning interracial marriage was race discrimination prohibited under the Constitution. If discrimination based on the race one is oriented to is race discrimination, then discrimination based on the sex one is oriented to is sex discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit decision is the first appellate court decision to employ this reasoning (for a lower court example, see Videckis v. Pepperdine, a Title IX case). Other appellate courts in the (sometimes distant) past have ruled against the gay or lesbian plaintiff on the grounds that Congress could have, but did not, include sexual orientation as a Title VII protected characteristic. The Seventh Circuit's departure from this reasoning sets up a circuit split that gives the Supreme Court a reason to weigh in should it so choose. Although the court's decision interprets the sex discrimination provision in Title VII, it and any Supreme Court decision that affirms it, should there be one, will no doubt be influential in the Title IX context as well, since courts routinely refer to definitions of sex discrimination from Title VII cases when analyzing what it means under Title IX.
Monday, September 26, 2016
Title IX Retaliation Case Heads to Jury
This week, jurors in San Diego will decide if San Diego State University committed unlawful retaliation when it fired women's basketball coach Beth Burns in 2013. At the time, Burns was a veteran head coach with a long success record and who had just posted a record number of season wins. She was also just nine months in to a 5 year renewed contract, and was making well over 200,000 a year. Her past performance evaluations praised her for running a solid program and doing an "excellent job."
So why was she fired? That is what the jury will have to decide after today's closing arguments summarize a month-long trial's worth of testimony. At the time Burns was fired, university officials cited as "sole cause" for her termination an incident in which she slapped her assistant coach's knees with a clipboard as they watched a game from the sidelines. At trial, however, witnesses for the university testified that Burns had a long history of treating her colleagues and employees with anger and disrespect.
Burns, on the other hand, testified that she was fired because she blew the whistle on unequal treatment for the women's athletics, including her team. Reportedly, a key piece of evidence in her case is an email between the (then) athletic director and a former university vice present that describes Burns as "driving us crazy w complaining."
Other questions raised a trial include: Why did the former athletic director destroy the notes of a key meeting about Burns with a university vice president? What did the president mean when he brought up Bobby Knight (former Indiana coach famous for his temper) in his testimony? Was Burns sabotaged by a member of her own staff who was working in cohorts with an associated athletic director to create a biased record of the coach's behavior? And of course, the question of whether the the university can credibly claim that Burns was fired for "misconduct" begs the question, was her conduct in fact a departure from athletics-cultural norms? (As one witness testified, "What most people call yelling, we (in athletics) call communication.”)
The jury is expected to receive the case on Tuesday, and will take however long it needs to render its verdict, to which nine of twelve jurors must agree.
Note: This is not the first retaliation case we've blogged about against San Diego State. In 2007, the university was sued by a former women's swim coach. She alleged that she was fired for complaining about gender inequality and sexual harassment. The university claimed that she was fired for poor performance, though, remarkably, the athletic department had closed the pool for seven years, making it difficult to produce a winning record! Eventually the university settled for $1.45 million dollars.
So why was she fired? That is what the jury will have to decide after today's closing arguments summarize a month-long trial's worth of testimony. At the time Burns was fired, university officials cited as "sole cause" for her termination an incident in which she slapped her assistant coach's knees with a clipboard as they watched a game from the sidelines. At trial, however, witnesses for the university testified that Burns had a long history of treating her colleagues and employees with anger and disrespect.
Burns, on the other hand, testified that she was fired because she blew the whistle on unequal treatment for the women's athletics, including her team. Reportedly, a key piece of evidence in her case is an email between the (then) athletic director and a former university vice present that describes Burns as "driving us crazy w complaining."
Other questions raised a trial include: Why did the former athletic director destroy the notes of a key meeting about Burns with a university vice president? What did the president mean when he brought up Bobby Knight (former Indiana coach famous for his temper) in his testimony? Was Burns sabotaged by a member of her own staff who was working in cohorts with an associated athletic director to create a biased record of the coach's behavior? And of course, the question of whether the the university can credibly claim that Burns was fired for "misconduct" begs the question, was her conduct in fact a departure from athletics-cultural norms? (As one witness testified, "What most people call yelling, we (in athletics) call communication.”)
The jury is expected to receive the case on Tuesday, and will take however long it needs to render its verdict, to which nine of twelve jurors must agree.
Note: This is not the first retaliation case we've blogged about against San Diego State. In 2007, the university was sued by a former women's swim coach. She alleged that she was fired for complaining about gender inequality and sexual harassment. The university claimed that she was fired for poor performance, though, remarkably, the athletic department had closed the pool for seven years, making it difficult to produce a winning record! Eventually the university settled for $1.45 million dollars.
Monday, June 06, 2016
New WSF Report Examines Gender Inequality in Coaching
Last week the Women's Sports Foundation issued a new report that examines gender inequality in the coaching profession. The report's authors surveyed over 2500 current and former coaches about their experiences and perceptions of the athletic departments in which they work, and revealed some surprising and some not-so-surprising results.
For example of of a not-so-surprising result, a significant minority of female head coaches (32%) perceive that men's teams other than football receive greater resources than women's teams. While football is certainly included in the Title IX analysis, separating it out for purposes of a survey paints an even more compelling picture of gender inequality. Yet, sadly, a third of female coaches also believed that they would put their jobs at risk if they spoke up about gender inequality.
The report also garnered data about how coaches view the equality in the terms of employment. A majority of coaches (male and female) agreed that it was easier for male coaches to get hired for high-level jobs, be awarded a multi-year contract, and successfully negotiate a raise. Meanwhile more than 40% of female coaches reported that they had experienced gender discrimination in the workplace and a third perceived that administrators favored male coaches. Notably, the report also included some interesting comments about "reverse discrimination" -- the perception that being male is disadvantageous in the athletic department workplace. In fact, 40% of male coaches, compared to only 12% of female coaches, believed that they had not gotten a coaching job because of their gender. This is an interesting pair of statistics that I think says something about gender and entitlement. Women are unlikely to believe they were ever turned down for a coaching job because of their gender despite constituting only about 20% of college head coaches. One explanation for this is that they are not going after jobs in men's sports because they do not feel entitled to those jobs the way that men feel entitled to the coaching jobs in women's sports.
On the other hand, men have nearly all of the coaching jobs in men's sports and even a majority of the coaching jobs in women's sports, yet a significant percent of them still perceive that gender disadvantaged them in the hiring process. They made comments on the survey like, “I’m a white male and I can’t get the job because they have to hire a female or a minority. This is not right. The best candidate should be hired regardless of race or gender.” And, “I would do much better off professionally if I was a minority, handicapped, homosexual." They argue that "much less qualified" women "with less experience" are being hired instead of them.
Based on comments like these, one imagines the college coaching market flooded with applications from optimistic, overconfident women who are seeking jobs beyond their reach (and then managing to get hired for those jobs, no less.). There are a lot of gender stereotypes that pertain to hiring, but women being overconfident in their job applications is definitely not one of them. I also have to wonder how many of these respondents are defining "experience" in a self-serving way, like assuming they receive equal "credit" for having a background in baseball instead of softball, or men's hockey instead of women's (despite the men's and women's sports having different rules).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the recommendations section of the report focuses primarily on the barriers to leadership that female coaches are confronting. For example, the report recommended that athletic departments conduct open searches by hiring committees to fill high-level vacancies, including head coach positions. Departments should also have and follow policies that ensure job duties, evaluations, salaries, and other aspects of employment are handled without regard to gender. I also thought these two recommendations, aimed primarily at the NCAA, were particularly strong:
For example of of a not-so-surprising result, a significant minority of female head coaches (32%) perceive that men's teams other than football receive greater resources than women's teams. While football is certainly included in the Title IX analysis, separating it out for purposes of a survey paints an even more compelling picture of gender inequality. Yet, sadly, a third of female coaches also believed that they would put their jobs at risk if they spoke up about gender inequality.
The report also garnered data about how coaches view the equality in the terms of employment. A majority of coaches (male and female) agreed that it was easier for male coaches to get hired for high-level jobs, be awarded a multi-year contract, and successfully negotiate a raise. Meanwhile more than 40% of female coaches reported that they had experienced gender discrimination in the workplace and a third perceived that administrators favored male coaches. Notably, the report also included some interesting comments about "reverse discrimination" -- the perception that being male is disadvantageous in the athletic department workplace. In fact, 40% of male coaches, compared to only 12% of female coaches, believed that they had not gotten a coaching job because of their gender. This is an interesting pair of statistics that I think says something about gender and entitlement. Women are unlikely to believe they were ever turned down for a coaching job because of their gender despite constituting only about 20% of college head coaches. One explanation for this is that they are not going after jobs in men's sports because they do not feel entitled to those jobs the way that men feel entitled to the coaching jobs in women's sports.
On the other hand, men have nearly all of the coaching jobs in men's sports and even a majority of the coaching jobs in women's sports, yet a significant percent of them still perceive that gender disadvantaged them in the hiring process. They made comments on the survey like, “I’m a white male and I can’t get the job because they have to hire a female or a minority. This is not right. The best candidate should be hired regardless of race or gender.” And, “I would do much better off professionally if I was a minority, handicapped, homosexual." They argue that "much less qualified" women "with less experience" are being hired instead of them.
Based on comments like these, one imagines the college coaching market flooded with applications from optimistic, overconfident women who are seeking jobs beyond their reach (and then managing to get hired for those jobs, no less.). There are a lot of gender stereotypes that pertain to hiring, but women being overconfident in their job applications is definitely not one of them. I also have to wonder how many of these respondents are defining "experience" in a self-serving way, like assuming they receive equal "credit" for having a background in baseball instead of softball, or men's hockey instead of women's (despite the men's and women's sports having different rules).
Not surprisingly, therefore, the recommendations section of the report focuses primarily on the barriers to leadership that female coaches are confronting. For example, the report recommended that athletic departments conduct open searches by hiring committees to fill high-level vacancies, including head coach positions. Departments should also have and follow policies that ensure job duties, evaluations, salaries, and other aspects of employment are handled without regard to gender. I also thought these two recommendations, aimed primarily at the NCAA, were particularly strong:
- National athletic governance associations should require member institutions to undertake a periodic certification program or other third-party peer review of the operation, processes and policies of its member institution athletic programs to ensure compliance with legal requirements and best practices, including the employment and compensation of coaches.
- National and conference athletic governance organizations should require that member institution athletic programs must establish policies that require a minimum number of qualified minority applicants to participate in finalist inperson interview pool for all coaching positions.
Tuesday, March 29, 2016
Coach Fired After Dismissing Dating Player From the Team
Last week, news broke that Prairie View A&M University fired its women's basketball coach after she enforced a no-dating policy against two players who were in a relationship with each other. The players complained to the university that the policy was discriminatory and violated Title IX. As coach Dawn Brown reportedly has appealed the decision within the university system, she and her agent have also decried it publically as unjust "scapegoating."
Some additional facts about the coach's actions make it less clear that her actions were discriminatory and unlawful. First, the policy does not single out players from dating each other. They are also banned from dating coaches, trainers, managers, and other people associated with the program. To be fair, if you isolate the aspect of the policy that addresses players relationships with each other you could conclude that it discriminates based on sexual orientation (since only lesbians would have those relationships). But the policy as a whole is arguably neutral as to sexual orientation,since a straight player dating a male trainer would be just as vulnerable to dismissal as lesbian teammates dating each other. To be clear, I can think of better ways to create a policy about intra-team relationships. but a conclusion that this policy discriminates against lesbians is surely no slam dunk.
Even if we read the policy as discrimination against lesbians, it's not clear -- at least to me -- that this was the reason she was fired. For one thing, discriminating against lesbians doesn't necessarily violate the law -- as much as I'd prefer otherwise. Texas does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Title IX only covers discrimination based on sex. While one lower federal court has so far endorsed a view that sex discrimination under Title IX includes sexual orientation discrimination, this is not a universal interpretation and one that is not binding in other jurisdictions.
So if Prairie View A&M's explanation is that the coach was fired for "violating Title IX" this is (I hate to say) a stretch.
Legal issues aside, the facts suggested by Dawn Brown to the media also raise questions about the university's motive. She says that the policy was developed in consultation with the Title IX office, and that the Athletic Director was involved in the decision to enforce the policy against the players in question. If this proves true, this surely calls into question any explanation of Brown being fired over the enforcement of the policy. And as we have learned from other cases involving terminated coaches, when a university's rationale for firing a female coach doesn't ring true, it is sometimes pretext for discrimination.
Some additional facts about the coach's actions make it less clear that her actions were discriminatory and unlawful. First, the policy does not single out players from dating each other. They are also banned from dating coaches, trainers, managers, and other people associated with the program. To be fair, if you isolate the aspect of the policy that addresses players relationships with each other you could conclude that it discriminates based on sexual orientation (since only lesbians would have those relationships). But the policy as a whole is arguably neutral as to sexual orientation,since a straight player dating a male trainer would be just as vulnerable to dismissal as lesbian teammates dating each other. To be clear, I can think of better ways to create a policy about intra-team relationships. but a conclusion that this policy discriminates against lesbians is surely no slam dunk.
Even if we read the policy as discrimination against lesbians, it's not clear -- at least to me -- that this was the reason she was fired. For one thing, discriminating against lesbians doesn't necessarily violate the law -- as much as I'd prefer otherwise. Texas does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Title IX only covers discrimination based on sex. While one lower federal court has so far endorsed a view that sex discrimination under Title IX includes sexual orientation discrimination, this is not a universal interpretation and one that is not binding in other jurisdictions.
So if Prairie View A&M's explanation is that the coach was fired for "violating Title IX" this is (I hate to say) a stretch.
Legal issues aside, the facts suggested by Dawn Brown to the media also raise questions about the university's motive. She says that the policy was developed in consultation with the Title IX office, and that the Athletic Director was involved in the decision to enforce the policy against the players in question. If this proves true, this surely calls into question any explanation of Brown being fired over the enforcement of the policy. And as we have learned from other cases involving terminated coaches, when a university's rationale for firing a female coach doesn't ring true, it is sometimes pretext for discrimination.
Wednesday, January 06, 2016
Tennessee Athletics Staff Settle Retaliation Suit for $750,000 + Fees
Three former members of the University of Tennessee Athletics Department staff have settled a lawsuit, ongoing since 2012, that challenged pay disparities between their positions that worked with female athletes and those doing the equivalent job for male athletes. They had also alleged that athletic department officials retaliated against them when they complained about pay discrimination.
Under the terms of the settlement, the university will pay each of the three plaintiffs -- former associate director of sports medicine, Jenny Moshak, and two former strength coaches Heather Mason and Collin Schlosser -- a combined total of $750,000, and will also cover the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, which are estimated to add to another quarter-million to price tag of the settlement.
This case is a good reminder of the various ways that sex discrimination can manifest in athletics. On the one hand, paying the trainers and coaches who work with female athletes less than those who work with male athletes reflects a devaluation of women's athletics, which affects not just women, but men like Schlosser who work in women's athletics as well. On the other hand, the plaintiffs' had alleged that the existence of a "testosterone wall" that kept women from being considered for the more lucrative staff positions working with male athletes. So women were additionally disadvantaged in that way as well.
Notably, this lawsuit was not the only one that alleged sex discrimination in Tennessee athletics back in 2012. The other case, filed by the former Lady Vols media director who alleged she was squeezed out because of her sex when the University merged its men's and women's athletics department, had already settled in 2014 for $320,000.
Under the terms of the settlement, the university will pay each of the three plaintiffs -- former associate director of sports medicine, Jenny Moshak, and two former strength coaches Heather Mason and Collin Schlosser -- a combined total of $750,000, and will also cover the plaintiffs' attorneys fees, which are estimated to add to another quarter-million to price tag of the settlement.
This case is a good reminder of the various ways that sex discrimination can manifest in athletics. On the one hand, paying the trainers and coaches who work with female athletes less than those who work with male athletes reflects a devaluation of women's athletics, which affects not just women, but men like Schlosser who work in women's athletics as well. On the other hand, the plaintiffs' had alleged that the existence of a "testosterone wall" that kept women from being considered for the more lucrative staff positions working with male athletes. So women were additionally disadvantaged in that way as well.
Notably, this lawsuit was not the only one that alleged sex discrimination in Tennessee athletics back in 2012. The other case, filed by the former Lady Vols media director who alleged she was squeezed out because of her sex when the University merged its men's and women's athletics department, had already settled in 2014 for $320,000.
Wednesday, November 11, 2015
Former Iowa Athletics Administrator Files Retaliation Suit
Jane Meyer, a former senior associate athletic director, sued the University of Iowa last week, alleging that she was demoted in retaliation for complaining about the termination of the field hockey coach in 2014. The coach, Tracy Griesbaum, is Meyer's partner. As we have noted already on the blog, Griesbaum was fired last year after some of her players complained that she was verbally abusive, but Griesbaum and her supporters say that her termination reflects a double standard that punishes female coaches for behavior that is tolerated and even expected in men's sports. The Office for Civil Rights is currently investigating whether Griesbaum's termination violates Title IX.
Meyer, meanwhile, who had worked in Iowa's athletics department since 2001,was transferred out of the department and reassigned to a job in facilities the very day after she presented the Athletic Director with a written complaint challenging the discrimination against female coaches and other women in the department. The university claims that her transfer was necessary to avoid a conflict that Meyer would have in the event that Griesbaum sued the Athletic Department (which hasn't happened yet).
In addition to challenging the alleged retaliatory demotion, Meyer's lawsuit also alleges that she was the victim of sex discrimination while she worked for the department when she was passed over for promotion to deputy director despite her qualifications for the job. She also alleges that she was paid substantially less than male administrators with comparable jobs.
Meyer's lawsuit was filed in state court. Notably, Iowa's employment discrimination law expressly covers discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Meyer reportedly seeks reinstatement to her former position, back pay to account for sex discrimination related to her salary, and an external review of the department's demotion and hiring decisions.
Meyer, meanwhile, who had worked in Iowa's athletics department since 2001,was transferred out of the department and reassigned to a job in facilities the very day after she presented the Athletic Director with a written complaint challenging the discrimination against female coaches and other women in the department. The university claims that her transfer was necessary to avoid a conflict that Meyer would have in the event that Griesbaum sued the Athletic Department (which hasn't happened yet).
In addition to challenging the alleged retaliatory demotion, Meyer's lawsuit also alleges that she was the victim of sex discrimination while she worked for the department when she was passed over for promotion to deputy director despite her qualifications for the job. She also alleges that she was paid substantially less than male administrators with comparable jobs.
Meyer's lawsuit was filed in state court. Notably, Iowa's employment discrimination law expressly covers discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Meyer reportedly seeks reinstatement to her former position, back pay to account for sex discrimination related to her salary, and an external review of the department's demotion and hiring decisions.
Monday, July 20, 2015
EEOC Ruling on Sexual Orientation Discrimination Could Influence Title IX Cases
Last week, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a ruling that asserted its jurisdiction under Title VII over an employee's case in which he alleged he was denied a promotion because of his sexual orientation. The Commission acknowledged that Title VII contains no express prohibition on sexual orientation-based discrimination. But it ruled that a complaint about discrimination because of one's sexual orientation is "necessarily" a complaint that the employer took sex into account, as is thus proper to consider under Title VII. Here is some of its reasoning:
The EEOC's conceptualization of sexual orientation discrimination as entirely within the ambit of sex discrimination is a broader definition of sex discrimination than has been applied by most courts. Courts are generally willing to accept that sex discrimination covers discrimination on the basis of an employee's gender-nonconforming appearance and behavior in the workplace, which may include (for example) claims by gay male employee targeted for feminine mannerisms, or a lesbian employee discriminated against for masculine appearance. But the EEOC's recent interpretation goes beyond this and confirms that discrimination targeting the employee's sexual orientation per se is actionable.
This decision is directly binding only on future enforcement decisions by the EEOC in the context of cases involving the federal government. But, the EEOC's interpretations are often influential on the courts that consider the meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII's application to the private sector, as well what it means as used in other statutes, like Title IX. Thus, even though it doesn't govern the education context, the EEOC's decision helps strengthen arguments by students or school employees who may have been excluded from participation, or fired, or denied admission, or harassed because of their sexual orientation, by giving courts and attorneys a roadmap of persuasive reasoning to follow.
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is premised on sex-based preferences, assumptions, expectations, stereotypes, or norms. “Sexual orientation” as a concept cannot be defined or understood without reference to sex. A man is referred to as “gay” if he is physically and/or emotionally attracted to other men. A woman is referred to as “lesbian” if she is physically and/or emotionally attracted to other women. Someone is referred to as “heterosexual” or “straight” if he or she is physically and/or emotionally attracted to someone of the opposite-sex. It follows, then, that sexual orientation is inseparable from and inescapably linked to sex and, therefore, that allegations of sexual orientation discrimination involve sex-based considerations.The Commission continued to explain that if an employer fires a man for being in a relationship with another man, but would not fire a woman for being in a relationship with a man, that is treating the male employee differently because of his sex. It's also a natural extension of the "sex stereotyping" theory because heterosexuality is a sex stereotype.
The EEOC's conceptualization of sexual orientation discrimination as entirely within the ambit of sex discrimination is a broader definition of sex discrimination than has been applied by most courts. Courts are generally willing to accept that sex discrimination covers discrimination on the basis of an employee's gender-nonconforming appearance and behavior in the workplace, which may include (for example) claims by gay male employee targeted for feminine mannerisms, or a lesbian employee discriminated against for masculine appearance. But the EEOC's recent interpretation goes beyond this and confirms that discrimination targeting the employee's sexual orientation per se is actionable.
This decision is directly binding only on future enforcement decisions by the EEOC in the context of cases involving the federal government. But, the EEOC's interpretations are often influential on the courts that consider the meaning of sex discrimination under Title VII's application to the private sector, as well what it means as used in other statutes, like Title IX. Thus, even though it doesn't govern the education context, the EEOC's decision helps strengthen arguments by students or school employees who may have been excluded from participation, or fired, or denied admission, or harassed because of their sexual orientation, by giving courts and attorneys a roadmap of persuasive reasoning to follow.
Thursday, July 02, 2015
Rider College Softball Coach Files Lawsuit Challenging Dismissal
Patricia Carroll, head softball coach at Rider College since 1994, filed a lawsuit last week in the federal court in New Jersey, arguing that her employment contract was slated for non-renewal in retaliation for her complaints that Rider's women's programs received fewer resources than the men's. In particular, she alleges that her complaints targeted inequities in scholarship money and booster funding, as well as the size of coaching staff and quality of facilities like locker rooms.
Though Carroll has won three championships in the past, her record over the past three seasons is reportedly 26-127. So it's possible that the college will claim that its decision was motivated by performance rather than retaliation. To win her case, Carroll will have to undermine this rationale and prove that it is pretext for retaliation, such as by proving that other coaches with similar records (and who have not spoken out about Title IX violations) are retained.
Because the college's decision not to renew Carroll does not take effect until next summer, Carroll is in the unique position of challenging her termination while she is still employed. She is suing to keep her job, as well for unspecified compensatory and punitive damages.
Though Carroll has won three championships in the past, her record over the past three seasons is reportedly 26-127. So it's possible that the college will claim that its decision was motivated by performance rather than retaliation. To win her case, Carroll will have to undermine this rationale and prove that it is pretext for retaliation, such as by proving that other coaches with similar records (and who have not spoken out about Title IX violations) are retained.
Because the college's decision not to renew Carroll does not take effect until next summer, Carroll is in the unique position of challenging her termination while she is still employed. She is suing to keep her job, as well for unspecified compensatory and punitive damages.
Wednesday, July 01, 2015
Fifth Circuit Decision Flags Area of Uncertainty in Future Title IX Retaliation Cases
On Monday the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of Anthony Minnis, the former women's tennis coach at Louisiana State, who had sued the university challenging his dismissal and other employment practices as racially discriminatory as well as retaliation for Title IX advocacy on behalf of his team.
Regarding the Title IX claim, Minnis's legal argument was that the appellate court should address his retaliation claim in order to resolve a question of legal uncertainty regarding the application of Title VII standards to Title IX cases. Typically, when courts apply Title IX in the employment context, they are influenced by cases applying Title VII, the federal employment discrimination statute, which also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Recently, in 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII retaliation plaintiffs must prove that retaliation was the "but for" cause of their termination or other adverse action. In other words, they must show that the employer was solely motivated by retaliation, rather than by a "mixed motive" that includes retaliation among other reasons. Because employers' motives are frequently complicated and plausibly involve multiple factors, the Supreme Court's decision considerably narrowed the scope of Title VII's application to retaliation claim.
Minnis's lawsuit used Title IX, rather than Title VII, to advance his retaliation claim. If his case had not been dismissed on summary judgment grounds, the lower court might have had to consider the question of whether Title IX continues to allow retaliation plaintiffs to prevail in mixed-motive cases, or whether the Supreme Court's rejection of mixed motive cases under Title VII extends to Title IX as well. Minnis argued that the appellate court should have taken his appeal so that they could address that issue and provide clarity to lower court in its jurisdiction. However, the lower court's dismissal of Minnis's retaliation claim did not turn on whether the university had a single or mixed motive. Rather, the lower court ruled that Minnis failed to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he engaged in protected conduct. (Because both the men's and women's tennis coaches had advocated for an indoor facility, this could not even plausibly be a Title IX retaliation claim, according to the lower court.) Since his case would not fall under Title IX to begin with, the court does not reach the legal question over whether mixed-motive arguments are still available to Title IX retaliation plaintiffs.
But the decision reminds us that this is an area of legal uncertainty that will eventually have to be addressed in future cases.
Decision: Minnis v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 2015 WL 3941846 (5th Cir. June 29, 2015).
Regarding the Title IX claim, Minnis's legal argument was that the appellate court should address his retaliation claim in order to resolve a question of legal uncertainty regarding the application of Title VII standards to Title IX cases. Typically, when courts apply Title IX in the employment context, they are influenced by cases applying Title VII, the federal employment discrimination statute, which also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Recently, in 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII retaliation plaintiffs must prove that retaliation was the "but for" cause of their termination or other adverse action. In other words, they must show that the employer was solely motivated by retaliation, rather than by a "mixed motive" that includes retaliation among other reasons. Because employers' motives are frequently complicated and plausibly involve multiple factors, the Supreme Court's decision considerably narrowed the scope of Title VII's application to retaliation claim.
Minnis's lawsuit used Title IX, rather than Title VII, to advance his retaliation claim. If his case had not been dismissed on summary judgment grounds, the lower court might have had to consider the question of whether Title IX continues to allow retaliation plaintiffs to prevail in mixed-motive cases, or whether the Supreme Court's rejection of mixed motive cases under Title VII extends to Title IX as well. Minnis argued that the appellate court should have taken his appeal so that they could address that issue and provide clarity to lower court in its jurisdiction. However, the lower court's dismissal of Minnis's retaliation claim did not turn on whether the university had a single or mixed motive. Rather, the lower court ruled that Minnis failed to establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he engaged in protected conduct. (Because both the men's and women's tennis coaches had advocated for an indoor facility, this could not even plausibly be a Title IX retaliation claim, according to the lower court.) Since his case would not fall under Title IX to begin with, the court does not reach the legal question over whether mixed-motive arguments are still available to Title IX retaliation plaintiffs.
But the decision reminds us that this is an area of legal uncertainty that will eventually have to be addressed in future cases.
Decision: Minnis v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ., 2015 WL 3941846 (5th Cir. June 29, 2015).
Friday, June 05, 2015
OCR Will Investigate Iowa Complaint
Last February we blogged about the complaint University of Iowa field hockey players filed against the university over the termination of their coach, Tracey Griesbaum. This week we learned that the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights has decided to investigate the complaint and determine whether the university in fact discriminated against the players in violation of Title IX.
We believe this is the first time the government has ever considered a complaint about a coach's termination to be sex discrimination from the players' point of view. Title IX regulations require equal treatment between men's and women's programs in the aggregate, including the quality of coaching athletes receive as a component of that requirement. The players argue that when Iowa fired Griesbaum over complaints about her demanding coaching style, the university imparted a sexist double standard that deprived them of the opportunity to be challenged by a successful, demanding coach. Importantly to the framing of this claim, male athletes at Iowa are given that opportunity, as evidenced by the fact the university has never disciplined coaches of men's teams for being too hard on them.
It will also be interesting to see whether OCR looks at the harmful message a university sends to female players who might be aspiring coaches when it fires a female coach over conduct that is tolerated and even encouraged from male coaches. Because female athletes could be discouraged from pursuing a lifelong relationship with college athletics in a way that male athletes are not, this is arguably another way in which firing a female coach is sex discrimination from the players' point of view.
We believe this is the first time the government has ever considered a complaint about a coach's termination to be sex discrimination from the players' point of view. Title IX regulations require equal treatment between men's and women's programs in the aggregate, including the quality of coaching athletes receive as a component of that requirement. The players argue that when Iowa fired Griesbaum over complaints about her demanding coaching style, the university imparted a sexist double standard that deprived them of the opportunity to be challenged by a successful, demanding coach. Importantly to the framing of this claim, male athletes at Iowa are given that opportunity, as evidenced by the fact the university has never disciplined coaches of men's teams for being too hard on them.
It will also be interesting to see whether OCR looks at the harmful message a university sends to female players who might be aspiring coaches when it fires a female coach over conduct that is tolerated and even encouraged from male coaches. Because female athletes could be discouraged from pursuing a lifelong relationship with college athletics in a way that male athletes are not, this is arguably another way in which firing a female coach is sex discrimination from the players' point of view.
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
Another female coach terminated: University of Delaware
In the wake of similar stories out of Duluth, Iowa, and Tufts, we note that another female coach has been terminated this year, this time by the University of Delaware.
Softball coach Jaime Wohlbach was reportedly fired abruptly on Monday afternoon, in the middle of her season. According to Wolhbach, she was told at the time that she "ran a hostile environment" for her players, which she disputes and points out that she had not received any indication from her supervisor that players had complained or were unhappy.
Considering public comments Wohlbach has since made, it appears that an alternative possible explanation for her termination is that it is the culmination of an ongoing conflict with her supervisor, associate athletic director Joe Shirley, whom Wolhbach accuses of micromanaging her team and giving her an unwarranted poor performance evaluation. Given that Wohlbach apparently reported him to human resources for "bullying," it seems possible that her termination is retaliation for her complaint.
It remains to be seen whether Wohlbach will take any legal action invoking Title IX. It is certainly possible that the "bullying" she complained of targeted her because she is a woman and/or because she coaches a woman's team. Additionally, if the university had actually received complaints about the coach's "hostility" towards her players, the fact that its response to those complaints was to immediately terminate the coach could reflect a sexist double standard, if it is the case that Delaware would have permit male coaches with more leeway in that situation, such as an opportunity to address or explain the complaints.
The Title IX angle is speculation on my part. But since we have seen other examples of similar bias against women coaches, including the very recent examples noted above, it is not far fetched to consider the possibility of sexism underlying this case as well.
Softball coach Jaime Wohlbach was reportedly fired abruptly on Monday afternoon, in the middle of her season. According to Wolhbach, she was told at the time that she "ran a hostile environment" for her players, which she disputes and points out that she had not received any indication from her supervisor that players had complained or were unhappy.
Considering public comments Wohlbach has since made, it appears that an alternative possible explanation for her termination is that it is the culmination of an ongoing conflict with her supervisor, associate athletic director Joe Shirley, whom Wolhbach accuses of micromanaging her team and giving her an unwarranted poor performance evaluation. Given that Wohlbach apparently reported him to human resources for "bullying," it seems possible that her termination is retaliation for her complaint.
It remains to be seen whether Wohlbach will take any legal action invoking Title IX. It is certainly possible that the "bullying" she complained of targeted her because she is a woman and/or because she coaches a woman's team. Additionally, if the university had actually received complaints about the coach's "hostility" towards her players, the fact that its response to those complaints was to immediately terminate the coach could reflect a sexist double standard, if it is the case that Delaware would have permit male coaches with more leeway in that situation, such as an opportunity to address or explain the complaints.
The Title IX angle is speculation on my part. But since we have seen other examples of similar bias against women coaches, including the very recent examples noted above, it is not far fetched to consider the possibility of sexism underlying this case as well.
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